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FOREWORD

Global arms proliferation continues to be a key concern
for the United States, particularly the export role of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). Clearly, the PRC is a key
player in the world’s arms bazaar. Although China
experienced a significant decline in its arms exports in the
1990s (down from the boom times of the 1980s), the PRC
provides a significant array of lethal weapons and sensitive
defense technologies to states around the world. These
exports provide an invaluable means by which to assess the
progress and performance of China’s military-industrial
complex. Moreover, these products may represent the very
systems and technological know-how that the United States
and allied forces will encounter in a future conflict.
Authored by two of the world’s foremost experts on
Chinese arms proliferation, this monograph provides the
most up-to-date, comprehensive, and authoritative opensource treatment of the subject available anywhere. The
Strategic Studies Institute is proud to publish it.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY

It has been nearly 10 years since a comprehensive study
has been undertaken to fully assess the trends, processes,
and implications of China’s arms exports. For a number of
reasons the time is ripe for the present study to take up this
subject.
First, over the course of the 1990s, questions of Chinese
arms proliferation emerged as a central problem in
U.S.-China relations. Second, in spite of this valid
continuing concern for U.S. interests, encouraging overall
trends in Chinese arms exports principles and practices
have resulted in more concrete Chinese unilateral,
bilateral, and international commitments to stem its
transfers of weapons and technologies on the one hand,
coupled with market forces causing a steep overall decline
in its major conventional weapons exports over the past 10
years on the other.
Third, far more data, information, and documentation is
available today from China on a host of questions relevant
to this issue through access to officials, newspapers, policy
documents, published regulations, and official statements.
These sources—some of which are provided to a wider
audience for the first time in this study—offer new insights
into the players and process involved in Chinese arms
export policy, China’s military-technical relationships
abroad, the internal bureaucratic and institutional
pressures bearing on arms transfers, the strengths and
weaknesses of China’s export control system, and the extent
to which Chinese decisionmakers have embraced
international nonproliferation principles. Fourth, since late
1997 and early 1998, the Chinese arms production and arms
export system has undergone a sweeping reorganization
and restructuring process. While the basic outlines of this
shake-up are discernible, its implications for future arms
exports are less clear and require careful analysis.
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Finally, the upshot of these trends points to enduring
and legitimate U.S. concerns over Chinese arms exports and
proliferation activities. At the very least, this issue will
remain a contentious one and will impede progress in the
broader effort of the two countries to stabilize their
relationship. In addition, in spite of a relative decline in its
arms exports overall, China continues to provide sensitive
weapons and technology to a range of recipients
Washington views with concern: Iran, Myanmar (Burma),
North Korea, Pakistan, and others. There is little doubt that
China will employ these types of transfers as a form of
leverage in its discussions with U.S. officials on other issues
related to areas of concern for China, such as U.S. arms
sales to Taiwan. More importantly, it remains highly likely
that U.S. security interests and military forces overseas will
continue to confront—both diplomatically and
militarily—the challenge posed by Chinese weapons in
sensitive regions across Asia and the Middle East.
As a result, it is imperative to gain greater insight into
Chinese arms export policies, players, and processes and
their implications for U.S. interests. This study tackles
these issues in two principal parts. First, in order to set the
context of the study, we assess past, present, and future
quantitative and qualitative trends in Chinese conventional
arms transfers. The second part of the study examines
Chinese arms export policy, players, and process in turn.
Charts and documents attached as appendices further
supplement the work of the study.
Drawing from this research, the study reaches the
following principal findings:
BACKGROUND TRENDS
• Arms Exports in Decline. All available evidence
indicates that China’s arms exports have contracted
considerably since 1990. This trend will likely continue into
the next decade. Total Chinese arms exports declined 75
percent from 1990-98. China’s share of the world arms
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market also declined significantly, especially in exports to
developing countries.
• Market Conditions Worsening. The major reason
for this decline is a shift in the global arms market towards
advanced, high-technology weapons which China is largely
unable to provide. China has only a limited ability to
produce high-technology weapons, while the United States,
Russia, and Western European countries have been willing
to export advanced weapons to developing countries.
China’s remaining customers are unable to purchase from
the West due to political constraints and are unable to afford
Western weapons. China has also accepted arms-control
and nonproliferation commitments which restrict its ability
to export its most competitive weapons—ballistic and cruise
missile systems.
• Market Share Shifting. Over the 1990s, China’s
customer base contracted significantly and shifted from the
Middle East to Asia. Chinese arms exporters recruited few
new buyers for conventional weapons, relying mainly on
modest transfers to traditional clients like Iran, Pakistan,
Myanmar (Burma), Sri Lanka, and a few African countries.
None of these are likely major growth markets, and their
demand for Chinese arms may contract if Western weapons
systems become available. Some former customers like
Thailand and Saudi Arabia simply stopped buying Chinese
arms in favor of Western systems. Indeed, technical
problems caused several countries to remove Chinese
weapons from their inventories.
• Limited New Markets. China’s active search for new
markets for conventional arms has produced only limited
results. In recent years, China has concluded some small,
mostly one-time deals with new customers such as
Armenia, Turkey, Kuwait, Croatia, and possibly Serbia.
China’s military exports to Croatia could be the beginning of
sustained arms transfer relationships, possibly including
production technologies. Recent visits by Chinese military
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leaders to Latin America suggest an attempt to expand a
meager market share in that region.
• Export Composition Changing. The composition of
China’s weapons exports has changed in the last several
years. Suggestions in the early 1990s that China might
increase arms sales by specializing in low-end aircraft and
various types of anti-ship missiles and medium-range
surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) did not come to fruition.
China has sustained its arms export business through
minor transfers of diverse weapons systems. However, some
specialization in low-end, short-range SSMs and
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) may be developing. In
particular, China’s sales of SAMs, especially portable
versions, represent one of the few growth areas in the 1990s.
POLICY CHARACTERISTICS
• Flexible Arms Export Principles. China’s formal
arms sales policy is shaped around three pillars: export
principles, export regulations, and participation in
international arms transfer control regimes. These allow
sufficient flexibility to justify a variety of arms exports.
China supports the broad aims of the United Nations
Register on Conventional Arms (UNROCA) and the
Wassenaar Arrangement, but its limited participation in
the former and reluctance to join the latter reveals an
ambivalent approach to restraint and transparency in arms
exporting.
• New Export Regulations. In 1997, China issued its
first publicly available export control regulations covering
military products. These new regulations represent a major
advance compared with China’s previous export controls,
which were suited to a centralized, planned economy. These
regulations legally codify China’s export principles, adopt
some international export control standards, reduce
confusion in the export control process, and are more
transparent than previous laws. The new regulations will
facilitate better export control management by specifying
x

procedures for license application, consideration, and
approval.
• Weaknesses of Regulations. China’s 1997 export
control law exhibits certain weaknesses which may
complicate effective implementation. Most notably, the
regulations do not include a list of specific military items
controlled under the regulations, resulting in uncertainty
about what items are covered under this law. It is not clear
whether China has an informal internal control list or
whether it references an international one.
PLAYERS
• Government Reorganization. The Chinese
government underwent a major reorganization in March
1998 which downsized and restructured much of the
government bureaucracy, including the defense industrial
sector. The structural changes raise uncertainties in the
short- to medium-term about the proper functioning of
export controls on military items and other sensitive
technologies. In the long-term, however, these changes—if
properly implemented—may create a more organized and
rational system for controlling military exports.
• Organizational Uncertainties. As a result of the
ongoing government reorganization, the agency originally
responsible for controlling arms exports was abolished, and
its successor has not been formally identified. This
uncertainty blurs lines of authority and increases the risk of
illicit military transfers. The newly civilianized
Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for
National Defense (COSTIND) may have assumed
coordinating responsibility for military exports and
imports. COSTIND has already been given the
administrative and regulatory responsibility for China’s
defense industry, while the Research and Development
(R&D) and production functions have been left to 10 newly
formed defense industrial enterprise groups.
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• The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and Arms
Exports. The impact of the Chinese military’s recent
exodus from commercial business activities on China’s arms
exports is unclear. In the past, trading companies operated
by Chinese military officers, such as Poly Technologies,
actively participated in China’s arms trade. The PLA’s
divestiture from business activities could give newly
independent firms incentives for illegal arms exports in
order to generate lost income. On the other hand, the
transfer of ownership may have weakened bureaucratic
linkages and personal relationships which could limit firms’
ability to export arms illegally.
CONCLUSIONS
• Continuing Concerns. Despite the declining volume
of Chinese arms exports combined with China’s shrinking
market share, Chinese arms transfers will continue to be an
issue of concern for U.S. policymakers. China’s willingness
to sell certain types of weapons to nations of U.S. concern
indicates that Chinese arms sales will remain an area of
interest to U.S. officials and analysts. Many of these
objectionable sales do not violate international law or
multilateral export control regimes and, thus, will have to
be dealt with bilaterally. Moreover, China continues to link
its arms exports to other sensitive issues, such as U.S.
military sales to Taiwan. China may use arms exports to
particular countries as leverage in bilateral debates with
the United States. Thus, U.S. concerns about specific sales
will likely be a periodic source of tension in U.S.-China
relations.
• Possible Future Exports. China’s strong opposition
to U.S. plans to provide theater missile defense (TMD)
technology to East Asia partners, especially to Taiwan,
could trigger a new round of arms exports from Beijing.
Chinese officials state TMD sales to Taiwan are a violation
of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and a
form of missile proliferation which may lead Beijing to
xii

reconsider its existing missile nonproliferation
commitments. In retaliation for U.S. exports of TMD
systems to Taiwan, China may lift its unilateral ban on
cruise missile sales to Iran, considering it was adopted in
response to significant U.S. pressure and is not part of
China’s international nonproliferation commitments.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND TRENDS IN CHINESE ARMS
EXPORTS

FROM IDEOLOGY TO PRAGMATISM
Beginning in the mid to late 1980s, Chinese arms
transfers increasingly became an issue of concern for U.S.
policymakers. Of greatest concern were China’s exports of
particular types of weapons (especially ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and nuclear-related transfers) to particular
regimes (such as Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Pakistan, Saudi
Arabia, and Syria). Starting in the late years of the Reagan
Administration, these concerns and the ensuing
confrontations with the Chinese have formed the
foundation for reoccurring and contentious Sino-U.S.
discussions over arms exports and nonproliferation.
A brief review of the historical context to Chinese arms
transfers will provide a greater understanding of the
current and likely future trends for China’s arms export
activities and related policies. 1 The greatest single shift in
Chinese arms export policy occurred in the mid to late
1970s when, in terms of quantity, quality, clientele, and
payment arrangements, China adopted a more “pragmatic”
approach to its arms export policies. In doing so, it
abandoned much of the Mao-era rhetoric and motivation
which drove its arms exports throughout much of the 1950s,
1960s, and early 1970s. These arms export policies involved
supporting nascent communist or socialist regimes, fueling
revolutionary unrest, generating anti-American and (later)
anti-Soviet support, providing mostly basic, small arms and
light weaponry, and doing so in the form of cost-free military
aid. China then shifted in the mid-1970s to dramatically
increase the quantity and quality of weapons exports, to
1

supply a diverse cross-section of importers, and to do so for
payment. In many respects these changes in Chinese
policies reflected larger trends in international security and
arms export markets.
In terms of quantity, while China had consistently
ranked among the top five arms exporters to the developing
world since the early 1950s, it steadily augmented its
market share especially beginning in the late 1970s and
early 1980s with the onset of the Cambodian civil war, the
war in Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war. According to
data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), China quadrupled its share of
exports to the developing world, rising from a 1.8 percent
share over the period 1970 to 1979 to gain nearly 8.0 percent
of the market by 1990. If measured in terms of contracted
value (rather than actual transfers), China had by 1990
risen to become the world’s third largest exporter to the
developing world. 2 In reaching these heights, China
paralleled the spectacular increase overall in arms exports
to the developing world from the mid-1970s to the late
1980s.
Qualitatively, Chinese arms exports also began to
improve by the mid-1970s. Indeed, by the mid-1980s China
began to develop made-for-export weapons which
represented the highest quality military R&D and
production it had to offer. In addition, China shifted from
the provision of mostly small arms and light weapons to
sales of complete major weapon platforms, and did so at
levels unseen since the provision of weapons to North Korea
in the 1950s. For example, with the exception of some
anti-aircraft missile batteries transferred to Albania in the
mid-1960s, virtually all of Chinese missile-related
exports—anti-air, anti-ship, anti-tank and ballistic
missiles—took place from 1978 onwards. Again, this
reflects broader trends in the international system, which
saw the proliferation of far more sophisticated weapons in
the developing world, especially as the United States and
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the Soviet Union provided their Cold War proxies with
increasingly advanced military means.
Perhaps most importantly, Chinese “pragmatism” in its
arms export policies can be seen in the diversification of its
client list to include “non-traditional” recipients of Chinese
military hardware, including recipients with which China
did not have formal diplomatic ties, or toward which it had
been openly hostile in the past. In the 1960s and early
1970s, China was particularly active in supplying
revolutionary governments and movements, especially in
Asia and Africa. However, from the mid-1970s, China
diversified its recipients to include Israel and Saudi Arabia
(neither had diplomatic relations with China at the time),
Chile, Iran, Iraq, Myanmar, Oman, Sri Lanka, Syria,
Thailand, and even the United States (some 24 F-6 and F-7
aircraft were provided to the United States for training
purposes in 1988 and 1989). Partially rooted in its
“independent” foreign policy line of the mid-1980s, China
broke from Cold War divisions to provide regional conflicts
with ready access to significant amounts of cheap weaponry.
Finally, the decision to begin charging for military
exports—rather than offering them as military aid—also
signaled a greater pragmatism for Chinese arms export
policies. This decision was an especially lucrative one with
regard to the Iran-Iraq War, in which China supplied both
sides and garnered some $8 billion in arms exports to these
countries over the course of the 1980s. In seeking profits,
not only was the Chinese defense industrial base eager to
seek more clients, but the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
itself began to sell off its excess inventory as well. In some
cases, such as in the CSS-2 ballistic missile sales to Saudi
Arabia, such profit-seeking “pragmatism” may have
outweighed more fundamental foreign policy calculations.
Throughout this period of greater pragmatism, Chinese
leaders never lost sight of the practical strategic, political,
and economic benefits which could accrue from arms
transfers. In many respects, the shifts in Chinese arms
3

export policies not only reflected changes in the
international arms market, but also reflected changes in
China’s international security situation. Chinese arms
exports in the 1980s, for example, especially those to
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand,
and possibly even to Iran and Saudi Arabia, were intended
to shore up Chinese influence in the face of encroachments
by the Soviet Union and its client states along China’s
periphery during this period.
Thus, by the end of the 1980s, a more pragmatic and less
ideological set of arms export policies propelled China more
openly, and at times more contentiously, into the forefront
of the international arms market. These trends, and
especially Chinese arms exports to such recipients as Iran,
Iraq, Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, set the tone for
increased tensions between the United States and China on
questions of Beijing’s proliferation policies which continue
today.
Furthermore, the “pragmatism” of China’s arms export
activities since the mid-1970s resulted in several lingering
consequences which have a direct impact on U.S. interests.
First, China’s arms export policies of the 1980s fostered the
rise of both the PLA and China’s military industries as more
significant stakeholders in the development and
implementation of the country’s arms export and
nonproliferation policies. PLA leaders and defense industry
specialists are now actively involved in China’s arms sales
decisionmaking process as well as China’s broader
nonproliferation diplomacy. Second, China’s arms export
activities of the 1980s strengthened certain key
military-technical relationships for Beijing—such as with
Iran and Pakistan—which have outlasted and expanded
their original strategic foundations.
Third, even by the mid-1980s, an important
supplier-recipient pattern was emerging for Chinese arms
transfers, characterized in the main by two prominent
facets: one, China was seen as a “supplier of last resort” to
4

which “rogue” nations could turn when, because of the
nature of the regime, access to weapons from other suppliers
was circumscribed; two, China was seen as the “supplier of
last resort” of certain systems—such as ballistic missiles,
cruise missiles, and fighter aircraft—which other suppliers
were unwilling to provide. In the following sections, we will
examine these trends and their implications more closely.
THE 1990s AND BEYOND
With the end of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988, the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and the beginnings
of the Cambodian peace process in Southeast Asia, Chinese
arms exports—like those for many other suppliers—fell
precipitously. Beginning in the 1990s and throughout the
decade, China’s arms exports experienced gradual and
sustained shifts in volume, recipients, and the types of
weapons sold.
Some shifts in the 1990s were so significant they raise
serious doubts about China’s continued viability as a major
exporter of conventional weapons. During the last several
years, China’s arms exports generated a fraction of the
income compared to previous years and China’s share of the
developing world arms market declined. China signed few
new contracts for major weapons systems and the deals it
did sign were with its traditional clients, suggesting
difficulties in penetrating new markets. China also
cancelled some large and lucrative deals in response to
Western (mainly U.S.) opposition. Moreover, specialization
in exports of “mid-tech” missile and aircraft systems
appears unlikely. Thus, China’s role as a major player in the
global arms market is increasingly tenuous but potentially
troublesome, and deserves further examination.
To examine this situation, this analysis of China’s arms
exports in the 1990s is divided into four parts. The first one
analyzes the overall quantitative trends in Chinese arms
transfers in the past decade. The second section
disaggregates the information presented in the first section
5

in order to better understand the broad trends. It analyzes
the changes and shifts in Chinese arms exports to specific
regions, with particular attention to changes in market
share and recipients, shifts in the types of weapons
exported, and the distribution of weapons among regional
customers. A third section discusses China’s attempts to
find new markets for its arms exports; a final section offers
conclusions about the future directions of Chinese weapons
sales.
Quantitative Trends.3
China’s position as a major exporter of conventional
weapons is being increasingly called into question as the
volume and quality of its weapons exports and the number
of recipients have declined since the beginning of the 1990s.
While there are several methods to numerically evaluate
the trends in China’s arms exports, the most illustrative
indicator of this decline is the shrinking volume of arms
transfers as measured in total arms deliveries. In 1990
China sold $2 billion worth of arms (in current U.S. dollars).
In 1995 China’s arms exports had declined to $600 million,
and by 1998 this number had further diminished to $500
million (Fig. 1). Thus, over the course of 8 years, Chinese
arms exports have declined 75 percent. 4 Data from the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
similarly indicate that in 1997 and 1998 the volume of
Chinese arms sales further declined to $339 million and
$157 million, respectively (Fig. 2). In addition, this overall
decline in Chinese arms exports occurred during an
expansion of the developing world arms market to which
China sells nearly 100 percent of its arms (Figs. 3 and 4).
Given these numbers, it is not surprising that the decline in
Chinese arms exports is also reflected in its market share.
From 1990 to 1998, China’s share of the developing world
arms market shrank from 4.90 percent to 2.01 percent,
according to CRS data; SIPRI data suggest an even more
dramatic decline in market share to below 1.0 percent (Fig.
5). Thus, in terms of both delivery volume and market share,
6

the trend-line for China’s arms exports in the 1990s has
experienced a sharp decline.
Regional Distribution.
The Middle East. During the 1990s, Chinese military
exports to the Middle East underwent significant changes
in volume and the types of weapons exported, with lesser
changes in the regional recipients of Chinese arms. From
the early to mid-1990s, the Middle East was Beijing’s
largest and most lucrative weapons export market,
accounting for over 50 percent of China’s deliveries. China’s
principal recipient in the Middle East was Iran, while
substantially smaller amounts went to Israel ($100
million), Libya ($100 million), Saudi Arabia ($800 million),
and Iraq ($200 million). Moreover, during this period China
sold a wide variety of weapons to Middle Eastern countries
including artillery, supersonic aircraft, surface-to-air
missiles (SAMs), anti-ship missiles (ASMs), and some
surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs).
The amount and character of China’s arms exports to the
Middle East changed dramatically in the latter half of the
1990s. First and foremost, the Chinese share shrank with
Asia replacing the Middle East as the principal destination
for Chinese arms. This change reflected a major decline in
the volume of China’s arms transfers to Iran, and a loss of
customers like Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and Libya.
Moreover, the character of China’s arms transfers to the
Middle East changed dramatically as well. The most
significant changes were the reduction in number of
artillery, supersonic aircraft, SAMs, and SSMs sold, and the
large increase in the number of guided missile boats and
ASMs exported. In fact, Iran emerged as the single largest
buyer of China’s ASMs. The data further indicate that,
despite earlier projections, exports of light combat aircraft
to the Middle East did not emerge as a growth market for
China. 5
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Several factors help to explain these shifts throughout
the 1990s. First, Iran—China’s largest client in the
region—had become increasingly displeased with the
quality of China’s conventional weapons systems. At the
same time the Chinese became uncomfortable with
Tehran’s erratic payment arrangements which were
normally provided in the form of barter trade in oil. Iranian
military leaders reportedly canceled a major deal in 1996
because of mutual concerns and frustrations. 6 Moreover,
Iraq’s poor performance during the Gulf War in the face of
high-tech U.S. weapons further underscored Iran’s
apprehensions about the quality of Chinese weapons
systems. The Gulf War demonstrated that low-tech military
weapons (even well maintained ones) could easily be
defeated by high-tech systems.
Furthermore, Beijing’s nonproliferation commitments
significantly affected China’s arms exports to the Middle
East, especially to Iran. Beijing’s various pledges, which it
appears to take increasingly seriously, have curbed the flow
of various ballistic and cruise missile systems to the Middle
East. China’s SSM sales to the Middle East went from 170 in
early 1980s to zero in the latter part of the decade. In the
early 1990s, U.S. pressure on China to adhere to Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) guidelines played a
role in convincing Beijing to cancel the projected sale of M-9
missiles to Syria and Iran. Also, in September 1997 U.S. and
Chinese negotiators reached an agreement on ending
further sales of C-801 and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles
(and associated production technologies) to Iran during
meetings in New York City between Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian
Qichen. 7 China’s cancellation of these missile deals in
response to U.S. pressure has also reduced the likelihood of
future Sino-Iranian military cooperation because the
Chinese are increasingly viewed as unreliable and
capricious suppliers in Tehran.
These three factors collectively explain the reduction in
China’s arms exports to the Middle East in the late 1990s.
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They also represent real constraints on further
Sino-Iranian military cooperation which will have to be
surmounted for future deals to come to fruition.
Asia. The pattern of China’s weapons transfers to
countries in East Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia also
changed significantly in terms of both volume and character
over the course of the 1990s. In the early part of the decade,
Asia was China’s second most important market after the
Middle East. During this period Beijing transferred a wide
variety of military equipment (almost every type, except for
submarines and helicopters) to a variety of Asian nations.
The principal Asian recipients of Chinese weapons were
Pakistan, Myanmar, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri
Lanka. 8
In the second half of the 1990s, the value of China’s arms
sales to Asia gradually declined but not nearly as
dramatically as in the Middle East. Asia quickly emerged as
China’s most significant market for weapons exports. In
terms of China’s customers, Pakistan and Myanmar
remained faithful clients whereas exports to Thailand,
Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka declined sharply. The character
of China’s weapons exports underwent an equally dramatic
change. China’s exports of armored personnel carriers
(APCs), SAMs, helicopters, and, most notably, supersonic
aircraft grew significantly whereas transfers of tanks,
artillery, minor surface weapons, and SSMs shrank
considerably. Exports of entire classes of weapons, such as
SSMs, simply stopped. Congressional Research Service
(CRS) statistics indicated that Asia emerged in the latter
part of the 1990s as China’s most important market for both
supersonic aircraft and SAMs; the Asian market accounted
for over 80 percent of supersonic aircraft and about 60
percent of the SAMs China transferred to developing
countries from 1994 to 1998.
In broad terms, shifts in the key factors of accessibility,
price, and regional politics help to explain the trends
outlined above. First, Pakistan purchased large amounts of
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Chinese weapons in the 1990s, especially fighter aircraft,
for the dual reasons of accessibility and price. Beginning in
1990, the U.S. arms market was closed to Islamabad after
the Bush Administration’s imposition of the Pressler
Amendment, and Moscow’s strong ties with India precluded
the sale by Russia of sophisticated systems to Pakistan. 9 In
addition, Pakistan considered European weapons too
expensive. In 1995, for example, Pakistan began
negotiations with France on the purchase of Mirage
aircraft, but their high price prevented the conclusion of a
deal.10
Despite Pakistan’s extensive purchases of Chinese arms
in the 1990s, military cooperation with China has not been
trouble free. Pakistan has experienced technical problems
with the transmission and the gun accuracy of the T-85
tank. Pakistani military officials also began to view China
as an unreliable partner for co-production agreements. 11
The Sino-Pakistani effort to jointly develop the K-8 jet
trainer for mass production and large international sales
produced meager results due to the use of low-quality
engine technology and the overall poor construction of the
aircraft. Similarly, the joint program to produce the Super 7
fighter was delayed in part because of resource constraints
which prevented Beijing from meeting the project’s initial
R&D costs. 12 These factors collectively suggest that
Pakistan could conceivably change suppliers, assuming
market dynamics changed. If Pakistan’s access to U.S. or
Russian weapons suddenly increased or prices of European
arms declined, then Pakistan might diversify or completely
shift suppliers due to the vastly superior quality of these
weapons, particularly supersonic aircraft.
Second, changes in regional politics coupled with
increasing competition in the global arms market also
explains the contraction in China’s client base in Asia.
Initially, Thailand perceived the threat from Vietnam and
Cambodia to be sufficiently serious to warrant a defensive
military buildup which was facilitated by purchases of
Chinese weapons offered at “friendship prices.” After the
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Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia, however,
Thailand no longer felt the same security imperative and
arms imports from China dropped off accordingly.
Additionally, Thailand experienced a host of technical
difficulties with Chinese weapons and had considerable
trouble acquiring spare parts for Chinese systems
purchased during the Cambodian civil war. As a result, by
the mid-1990s Thailand expanded arms import
relationships with the West and currently relies almost
exclusively on U.S. and European suppliers.
Third, despite the range of Chinese clients in Asia, it is
worth highlighting that China exported few, if any,
weapons to East Asian countries, with the exception of
secret transfers to North Korea. 13 Many East Asian nations
such as Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea have
long-standing security concerns about China’s military
modernization efforts. The relative wealth of these
countries and their own indigenous defense production
capacity also allowed them to purchase and produce more
expensive and technologically advanced weapons.
Such conditions in Asia suggest a questionable future for
Chinese arms exports to the region. Of China’s two principal
arms recipients in Asia, Myanmar will almost assuredly
remain a faithful customer of Chinese weapons due to its
relative international isolation combined with its growing
political, economic, and strategic ties with Beijing. The
other main recipient, Pakistan, may become less willing to
purchase large amounts of Chinese weaponry, as noted
above. Given that Asia accounts for a very large share of
China’s supersonic aircraft exports and, within Asia,
Pakistan is the principal recipient of such systems, if
Islamabad shifted suppliers then China’s overall arms
export business would suffer a severe blow.
Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast to Asia and the Middle
East, China’s arms transfers to Sub-Saharan Africa
experienced noticeable increases in volume and shifts in
character during the 1990s. In the early part of the decade,
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Africa was a low-priority market for China, accounting for
less than one tenth of Chinese exports. Yet, from 1995 to
1998, China’s exports to Africa increased in terms of both
volume and market share. China exported $600 million
worth of arms to Africa during these 4 years, a 500 percent
increase from the early 1990s. These increases also
massively expanded China’s share of the African market
from 4.6 percent in 1991-94 to almost 22 percent in 1995-98.
Indeed, China in the latter half of the 1990s emerged as the
single greatest exporter of arms to Africa followed by Russia
with an 18 percent market share.
However, the actual composition and distribution of
these transfers suggest that China’s role in the African
arms market may not be as significant or sustainable as
statistics indicate. CRS data show that in the latter half of
the 1990s China transferred 10 supersonic combat aircraft,
3 minor surface weapons, and 10 “other aircraft” to African
countries. While these exports of moderately large systems
were sufficient to augment China’s role in the African arms
market, it is unclear whether China will be able to maintain
its current position over time.
Latin America. Throughout the 1990s, China’s arms
exports to Latin America remained relatively insignificant.
China transferred approximately $100 million worth of
artillery and supply aircraft to countries in Latin America
from 1990 to 1998. Interestingly, in the latter part of the
1990s Latin America emerged as an important market for
Chinese SAMs. China’s major export to the region was 190
surface-to-air missiles, making Latin America China’s
second largest market (after Asia) for SAM exports. In fact,
these two regions alone accounted for all of China SAM sales
in the 1994-98 period. Chinese military officials, including
senior Air Force and Navy leaders, recently visited various
Latin American countries and, in October 1998, Chief of the
PLA’s General Staff Fu Quanyou took a 13-day tour of Latin
America. Yet, whether these burgeoning military ties will
evolve into arms transfers remains an open question.
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Possible New Markets for Chinese Arms.
In the latter part of the 1990s, China had some limited
success recruiting new buyers for its weapons. Most of the
new deals have been relatively small in scale and represent
China’s traditional export categories. Also, it appears most
contracts represent one-time deals. In 1997, China
reportedly signed a $150 million agreement with Turkey for
the WS-1 artillery rocket. This deal represents China’s first
known export of this artillery system. China will supply
Turkey with one battery of complete missiles and the
materials, equipment, and technology to produce five more
batteries.14 In a similar deal, a Chinese firm sold eight
unidentified artillery rockets (possibly like the WS-1) to
Armenia in May 1999. However, the deal was cancelled and
the missiles returned when Azerbaijan filed an official
protest with Beijing because some of the missiles were
deployed in the disputed Nagorno-Kababakh region. 15
In a similar move, China is reportedly expanding its
military cooperation with Croatia. During a June 1998 visit
to Beijing by a Croatian Defense Ministry delegation,
Chinese and Croatian defense officials signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) to initiate
cooperation between China North Industries Corporation
(NORINCO) and Republika Hrvatska-Alan, the Croatian
state agency responsible for arms production. The extensive
MOU outlined the general parameters of cooperation and
“envisaged the development of technologies for third
markets, cooperation in the manufacturing of explosives,
and rocket missiles.” 16 Also in the Balkans, senior Serbian
authorities reportedly signed an agreement with
NORINCO in late 1997 for the purchase of Red Arrow-8
anti-tank missiles, and, as payment for the arms, Serbian
officials agreed to invest $5.8 million to build a fruit
processing factory outside Beijing. 1 7 Long-term
Sino-Serbian military technical cooperation may be
particularly appealing to both nations. In recent years and
before NATO action against Belgrade in 1999, Serbia had
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begun renovating many of its military production facilities,
such as the one owned by Crvena Zvezda located at
Kraguljvack, which produced T-72 style tanks and artillery.
Chinese companies—in particular NORINCO—have had
extensive experience producing similar types of military
goods; Chinese companies could also serve as a source of
spare parts for Serbian tanks and aircraft given their
similarity to Soviet-designed Chinese models.
In the Middle East, China has reached deals with both
Kuwait and Egypt. Beijing recently began participating in
Kuwait’s effort to rebuild its military after the Gulf War. In
mid-1997, Kuwait placed an order for 18 self-propelled guns
from NORINCO; this was the first time that Kuwait
purchased any weapons from China. This deal, although
small, is expected to be followed by subsequent ones so that
Kuwait can outfit two more battalions with these systems.
Also, China’s deal with Kuwait triumphed over competing
bids from South African, British, and American firms which
had all gone through extensive trials in Kuwait. 18 More
recently, in December 1999, China signed a $347.4 million
contract with Egypt to jointly manufacture 80 K-8E jet
trainers which China initially co-produced with Pakistan.
China plans to sell Egypt an entire assembly line for the
aircraft as well as provide Egypt with parts and materials,
maintenance support, and extensive technical training
(including the establishment of five aircraft R&D institutes)
for the K-8E jet trainer. 19 This represents China’s first
major military deal with Egypt since the export of F-6
fighters in the late 1970s and early 1980s. While its size and
scope are quite large for China, it is unclear whether this
agreement represents the beginning of a sustained arms
transfer relationship given Egypt’s heavy reliance on
Western military systems.
In addition to finding new customers, Chinese firms
have attempted to reestablish arms cooperation with old
clients like Thailand. Bangkok in the late 1990s
increasingly turned to the West due to the superior quality
of the weapons. Yet, in 1997 Thailand expressed an interest
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in purchasing a few hundred APCs from NORINCO (after a
deal with France fell apart), and the same year its military
authorities began negotiating the purchase of 30 HN-5A
portable air-defense systems from a Chinese company. 20
More recently, in 1998, Chinese officials courted Thai
military buyers by offering numerous incentives. A Thai
general noted that, during a June 1998 meeting, China
offered free spare parts for T-59 tanks, APC-85 personnel
carriers, 37mm anti-aircraft guns, and 122mm artillery
rockets, in addition to other cheaply priced weapons. To
further sweeten the deal, Chi Haotian reportedly offered not
to devalue the Thai currency in calculating payment for
arms purchases from Thailand. The decline in Thailand’s
economy may help explain its willingness to turn once again
to the “friendly prices” offered by the Chinese.
CONCLUSIONS
In all, China’s role in the global arms market will likely
continue to decline in the coming years. With past trends as
an indication, China faces significant barriers to expanding
its arms export business. First, China’s overall customer
base has contracted. In the latter half of the 1990s, China
recruited few new buyers for its conventional weapons while
continuing to rely on transfers to traditional clients like
Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, and a few African countries. In
addition, many former customers like Thailand, Egypt, and
Saudi Arabia simply stopped buying Chinese arms and
augmented their military technical relations with other
suppliers. Indeed, many even completely stopped using
Chinese weapons in their armed forces.
These trends help explain the steep declines in China’s
market share in regions like the Middle East. Moreover,
prospects for China’s arms export business are worsened by
the fact that sustained exports to its traditional clients are
an open question. Although Iran remained China’s single
largest Middle East customer throughout the 1990s, Iran
has become concerned about the quality of Chinese
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weapons. In addition, due to Beijing’s various
nonproliferation commitments, China can no longer export
the military systems Iran covets most. Without access to
China’s cruise missiles and only limited access to ballistic
missile technologies, it is unclear which Chinese military
goods, if any, Iran will purchase in the future. Similarly, if
Pakistan gains access to U.S. or Russian arms (such as
strike aircraft), then its reliance on Chinese systems will
probably be replaced with a much smaller level of imports
used to supplement its armed forces.
A second and equally significant barrier China faces is
the continued poor quality and increasing uncompetitivness
of its arms exports. Beijing continues to market much of the
same low-tech, antiquated, Soviet-designed goods that were
sold during the 1980s. While these systems will always have
the appeal of low prices, availability, simplicity, and
ruggedness, China cannot remain a significant arms
exporter by exclusively relying on sales of such military
goods in an increasingly competitive global arms market.
Even China’s naval exports, once an appealing option to
many countries for coastal defense, are based on Soviet-era
vessels which exhibit basic design and construction flaws in
addition to lacking modern naval electronics and weapons
suites crucial to warfighting. The number of nations that
shifted suppliers away from China during the 1990s
testifies to the challenge it faces in exporting higher quality
systems.
Moreover, earlier suggestions that China might
reinvigorate its arms sales business in the 1990s by
specializing in sales of low-end aircraft and various types of
anti-shipping and surface-to-surface missiles did not come
to fruition. In the latter part of the decade, China’s exports
of combat aircraft to developing countries declined overall,
particularly in the Middle East where no countries bought
Chinese aircraft. Rather, Asian countries emerged as the
principal customers of China’s fighters but even then the
majority of Asian deals were with countries which desired
western fighters but were precluded from buying them for a
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host of political and financial reasons. Even if China chose
to actively specialize in exports of low-cost, light combat
aircraft, it is unclear what systems it would sell, considering
that China has not yet developed a light fighter significantly
more advanced than the F-7 series. The K-8’s overall poor
quality has compromised its international prospects. Also,
the Super 7 remains in the design phase, will not receive
Pakistan’s full support, and thus may not have its first flight
test for at least 2 to 3 years. In addition, the Chinese Air
Force does not want the aircraft, and Pakistan is currently
the only known customer. Other Chinese made-for-export
aircraft, such as the FB-7, remain relatively untested and
have few international prospects.
In terms of missile exports, China’s nonproliferation
commitments combined with external pressure from the
United States represent real barriers to transfers of certain
ballistic and cruise missiles systems to countries in the
Middle East and South Asia. Assuming that Beijing
continues to adhere to its promises, and there is reasonable
evidence that it will, China is precluded from exporting
many of these items. These Chinese weapons, in particular,
are the ones most coveted by many developing countries.
To be sure, some specialization in low-end, short-range
SSMs and SAMs may still occur. China continues to export
non-MTCR ballistic missiles such as the 8610 and
ship-to-air missiles such as the LY-60N, but the more
capable and desirable systems such as the M-9, M-11, the
C-802, and follow-on, next-generation cruise missile
systems, will have continued restrictions on their export,
largely due to U.S. pressures. Beijing may also continue
exporting missile-related equipment, materials, and
technologies used in guidance and propulsion systems. Such
exports circumvent China’s nonproliferation commitments
while helping countries to self-sufficiently produce
medium-range missiles.
China’s sales of SAMs, especially portable versions, are
one of the few categories of exports that experienced
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significant growth in the 1990s, suggesting a possible area
of specialization. China sold several hundred of its
shoulder-fired QW-1 SAMs to Pakistan. The China
Precision Machinery Import & Export Corporation
(CPMIEC) recently developed a more advanced version, the
QW-2, with improved targeting and countercountermeasures. This new SAM may enter the export
market in 1-2 years. Chinese defense firms have also
developed two new ground-based SAM systems, the FM-90
and FT-2000, to be fielded by the PLA. Both systems could
be put on the export market as well. 21
Such specialization, however, is unlikely to compensate
for China’s heavy reliance on traditional buyers, its
contracting client base, Beijing’s continued export of
low-tech, unreliable weapons, and the political and
technical barriers to specializing in “mid-tech” weapons like
ballistic and cruise missiles. Thus, China’s prospects for
remaining a major arms exporter to the developing world
appear bleak. China will continue to provide moderate
amounts of low-end equipment to its longtime clients in
Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, but it is unlikely to
maintain the position it held during the 1980s and 1990s as
one of the world’s top five arms exporters. However, as noted
in the following section, in spite of these quantitative
declines, concerns persist about the potentially sporadic
and volatile nature of China’s arms exports in the future
given the ongoing reorganization and restructuring of
China’s bureaucracy.
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CHAPTER 2
CHINESE ARMS EXPORTS:
POLICY, PLAYERS, PROCESS

China’s official policies, its decisionmaking processes,
and the government institutions involved in conventional
arms exports have long been the subject of international
concern, especially since the 1980s when China emerged as
a significant, second-tier supplier of conventional weapons
and missiles to developing countries. China has exported a
variety of weapons to an eclectic mix of recipients in volatile
regions which have caused many countries to question
Beijing’s official positions and decisionmaking processes
related to arms sales. Most notably, China sold significant
amounts of arms to both Iran and Iraq during their lengthy
conflict. This two-handed approach raised questions about
the nature of China’s formal government policy regarding
weapons exports, and whether such a uniform position
existed at all. These concerns were further heightened by
China’s exports of cruise and ballistic missiles to countries
in the Middle East and South Asia because such exports are
uniquely destabilizing. In response to Western criticism of
many of these arms deals, the Chinese government often
formally denied that such weapons exports took
place—even when presented with evidence to the contrary.
These denials raised new questions about institutional
involvement in the arms export review process and the
extent to which these entities are accountable to the
government.
Furthermore, China’s recent efforts to restructure its
defense industrial complex combined with the
de-commercialization of the PLA have created even more
questions about the policy, process, and players involved in
Chinese arms exports. These structural changes have
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generated confusion about the authority and responsibility
of different government agencies involved in arms sales
decisionmaking and the extent to which coordination
occurs. Furthermore, the restructuring is taking place in
the context of worsening economic conditions in China’s
industrial and banking sectors, while foreign trade and
foreign investment stagnates. Amid this austere
uncertainty and organizational confusion, the prospects for
the illicit export of proscribed military items may increase.
However, over the long term this restructuring effort could
also create a more rational and institutionalized system for
overseeing China’s arms exports, as the responsibilities of
differing agencies are further delineated and clarified.
Regardless of the possible positive or negative
consequences, these structural shifts have directly
influenced the policy, process, and players involved in
China’s weapons exports. In an effort to elucidate some of
these trends, this section examines China’s existing
policies, the government and commercial institutions
involved in arms exporting, and the decisionmaking
processes with a particular focus on the impact of recent
structural changes.
CHINESE ARMS EXPORTS: THE POLICY
China structures its conventional arms export policy
around three pillars: export principles, export regulations,
and participation in international arms transfer control
regimes. Each will be examined in this section.
Export Principles.
First, the Chinese government has outlined in both
government documents and official statements a number of
principles which inform its arms sales decisions. In the 1998
white paper called China’s National Defense (Zhongguo de
Guofang), Beijing stated it “respects the right of every
country to independent or collective self-defense and to
acquisition of weapons for this purpose in accordance with
24

the principles contained in the Charter of the United
Nations.” 1 Yet China’s commitment to a nation’s right to
protect its security through arms sales is not absolute and
does not exist in a vacuum. The Chinese government
qualifies its previous commitment by noting that “[China] is
[also] concerned about the adverse effects on world security
and regional stability arising from excessive accumulations
of weaponry.” In an attempt to balance national defense and
regional stability, China has consistently stated that it
observes three principles in its arms dealing. First, its arms
sales must help the recipient nation enhance its capability
for legitimate (zhengdang de) self-defense. 2 Second, its
weapons exports must not impair the peace, security, and
stability of the relevant region and the world as a whole.
Third, China argues that its arms exports must not
interfere in the recipient state’s internal affairs. 3
While these military exports principles are consistent
with international norms and are intended to promote
international security, China’s interpretation and
application of them has been the source of significant
controversy in the past decade, especially in U.S.-China
relations. Applying the principles to potential arms deals
requires a Chinese official judgement which is often at odds
with Western interpretations. Some examples of differing
judgements include China’s export of C-801 and C-802
advanced cruise missiles to Iran, the sale of M-11 missiles to
Pakistan in the early 1990s, and ongoing exports of
missile-related technologies to Iran and Pakistan. In these
three instances, the United States argued that missile
exports would undermine regional stability and violate
China’s previous nonproliferation commitments. China, by
contrast, defended these deals by citing the self-defense
requirements of the recipients. Indeed, in response to
almost every claim (usually from Western sources) that
China exported dangerous weapons, government officials
tout the three principles as an explanation for Chinese
practices when, in fact, it is merely describing the official
policy. Moreover, Beijing’s responses to Western concerns
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suggest a further ambiguity with Beijing’s interpretation of
its three export principles: how are the principles prioritized
and which one takes precedence over the other two in
determining export decisions? Collectively these layers of
confusion regarding China’s interpretation and application
of its military export principles suggest that China can
flexibly employ these guidelines in order to justify export
decisions.
Export Control Regulations.
The second pillar of China’s arms sales policy is its
export control regulations covering sales of military
products and related technologies. China’s only public law
covering conventional military exports is the Regulations on
Export Control of Military Items (see Appendix II), which
the State Council and the Central Military Commission
issued in October 1997; it became effective on January 1,
1998. The regulations are aimed at “strengthening the
unified management of arms export and maintaining the
normal export order” and cover commercial exports of
military purpose equipment, specialized production
facilities, and other materials, technologies, and related
services. The new regulations represent a major advance
compared with China’s previous export control measures.
In the past, when China operated a planned economy,
export controls took the form of executive decrees. Yet, as
China opened up to the world and rapidly began to develop a
“socialist market economy,” it sought to change its export
control laws “in order to meet the requirements of the new
situation and as a concrete step towards the rule of law.” 4
The 1997 regulations have several key features. First,
these regulations codify the principles which guide China’s
arms export decisions. The Chinese government and
Chinese companies are now legally obligated to adhere to
the three principles discussed above. Given that the
regulations constitute Chinese law, both the government
and Chinese companies can be held to the legal restrictions
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and penalties outlined in the regulations. Second, the
regulations represent one of China’s first public efforts to
adopt international export control standards and practices.
The regulations require the adoption of an export licensing
system (based on international practices) and reference
internationally proscribed weapons and related
technologies. Third, the regulations help to reduce
confusion in export control decisionmaking by delineating
the rights and responsibilities of various government
organizations in determining which exports are
permissible. According to this law, the State Administrative
Committee on Military Product Trade (SACMPT)—under
joint control of the State Council and the Central Military
Commission(CMC)—had authority over all of China’s
conventional military exports. This commission possessed
an administrative office called the State Bureau of Military
Products Trade which is charged with supervising and
administering all of China’s conventional military exports.
Both organizations were abolished in 1998 following a
major bureaucratic reorganization effort and their
respective responsibilities are currently being
redistributed. The law has not yet been revised to reflect
these organizational changes.
Fourth, compared with China’s past export control
procedures, these regulations are more transparent and
will facilitate better export control management through
the adoption of distinct procedures for license application,
consideration, and approval. According to the 1997
regulations, an export license will most often be authorized
by the State Bureau of Military Products Trade alone or in
consultation with other government agencies; in the case of
“major” military exports, contracts and export licenses will
be reviewed by the SACMPT as well as by the State Council
and the CMC. In an effort to further tighten the licensing
system, the 1997 regulations stipulate that only companies
authorized by the SACMPT can export military products.
Lastly, the new law spells out criminal penalties for
violations. 5
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International Regimes.
The third pillar of China’s arms export policy is Beijing’s
participation in international arms transfer control
regimes. China has been a member of the UN Register of
Conventional Arms (UNROCA) since its creation in the
early 1990s, and China participated in the P-5 talks on arms
control in the Middle East. China’s participation in the
former was stronger than in the latter, even though Beijing
remains skeptical of all arms transparency regimes.
Beginning with the UNROCA’s creation in 1991 through
1997, China has consistently contributed annual
submissions of its arms imports and exports, and China has
participated in subsequent reviews of the UNROCA
process. 6 This information is all publicly available from the
UN and can be retrieved from the UN’s website. 7
Yet China has not fully supported the development and
expansion of the UNROCA. China did not participate in the
unanimous vote which created the Register. In addition,
China opposed measures to expand the scope of the Register
such as proposals calling for states to provide more
information on their annual submissions and the adoption
of measures to include procurement from national
production; also between 1992-95 China provided only the
basic information, not background or additional
information, on its annual submissions. 8 In some cases,
Chinese submissions to the UNROCA have omitted
transfers that other countries have listed as imports from or
exports to China, or which appear in other open-source
registers such as the SIPRI Yearbook.9
Furthermore, in June 1997 China opposed the
establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on Transparency in
Armaments (TIA). Noting that the UNROCA was already in
place and functioning, the Chinese ambassador to the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) said, “if the CD continues
to seek or explore some abstract or sweeping TIA measures,
my delegation does not see any practical meaning in this.
My delegation is not against transparency as a matter of
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principle. We only feel that all transparency measures are
in fact treaty-specific.” 10 In another case of military
transparency—the United Nations register of military
budgets which was established in 1980—China has yet to
file a return as of the end of 1997. 11
China’s recent participation in the UNROCA raises
further questions. In 1998, it failed to submit an accounting
of its arms exports and imports for 1997, breaking its
previous record of annual submissions since the register’s
inception. Beijing took this move to protest the U.S. listing
of its military exports to Taiwan in the U.S. declaration.
China argued that because Taiwan is not a UN member
state (or a sovereign country in China’s eyes), it has no
business being listed in the register. While the ultimate
resolution of this dispute is unclear, the fact that China
chose to use its submissions to the UNROCA as a means of
protest further signals China’s general lack of interest in
the register as an arms transparency measure.
In 1991 China participated in the U.S.-led effort among
the P-5 countries to negotiate guidelines covering arms
export to the Middle East. The negotiations, also called the
Arms Control in the Middle East (ACME) talks, were
intended to develop restraints on the export of weapons of
mass destruction and missiles to the Middle East. China
joined the talks from the beginning and participated in all
three rounds of senior level meetings held from 1991 to 1992
in London, Paris, and Washington. During the negotiations,
China expressed several reservations and opposed
proposals for the prior notification of arms transfers to the
Middle East and for the inclusion of missiles in the category
of “weapons of mass destruction” unless advanced strike
aircraft and certain types of naval ships were also covered.
In September 1992, China abruptly halted its participation
in the P-5 talks when the Bush Administration announced
the sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan. The talks have effectively
been suspended since late 1992, and there is no indication
they will be resumed. 12
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China’s formal participation in international
conventional arms transfer control regimes is limited to the
two forums mentioned above. China is not a member of the
Wassenaar Arrangement, COCOM’s successor, which seeks
to promote transparency and greater responsibility in the
transfer of conventional arms and dual-use goods and
technologies. The 33 states currently participating in
Wassenaar have agreed to control all items set forth in two
lists (a munitions list and a “core list” of dual-use goods and
technologies) with the objective of preventing unauthorized
transfers or re-transfers of these items. 13 China did not
participate in the original negotiation of the Wassenaar
Arrangement and has not been invited to join the
agreement either, mainly due to its inability to meet all four
of the membership criteria. 14
China supports the broad goals of the Wassenaar
Arrangement but has taken an ambiguous position on
joining the accord. During the discussions on the
establishment of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Chinese
Foreign Ministry stated that,
COCOM is a product of the Cold War and should have been
disbanded earlier. Whatever the new organization will be, it
must be beneficial to the development of economic and trade
relations, and the cooperation and exchange of science and
technology between all countries.15

More recently, in a February 1999 interview, Sha Zukang,
the Director General of the Chinese Foreign Ministry’s
Arms Control and Disarmament Department, expressed
China’s general interest in joining the arrangement. He
noted:
It is our understanding the Arrangement is a collective export
control regime designed to promote regional and international
security by requiring its members to take a cautious attitude on
their relevant exports. This is not at odds with China’s
nonproliferation policies.
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As a state capable of manufacturing and exporting weapons
and industrial equipment, China is following this issue. If the
lacunae such as lack of universality can be redressed, China
will be able to play a more active role in this process. However,
on the question of membership, China will consider this only
when all Arrangement members have reached a consensus
and unconditionally invite China to join the regime. We are
not in a hurry.16

One positive step China took in this direction was the
issuance in November 1998 of export control regulations
covering 183 dual-use technologies, some of which are
covered in Wassenaar’s “core list” of dual-use
technologies. 17 China’s Ministry of Foreign Trade and
Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) also released a
“Catalogue of Technologies which are Restricted or Banned
in China.” These documents may represent a further effort
to integrate international standards on military and
dual-use items into China’s existing export control laws
and, in broader terms, a move toward China’s eventual
membership in Wassenaar. Yet, it is unclear whether the
new regulations cover all of the items in the three
subcategories (basic, intermediate, and sensitive) of
Wassenaar’s dual-use list or in the munitions list of military
products. In addition, China’s perennial reservations about
arms transfer control regimes as articulated during the P-5
talks may preclude it from becoming an official member of
Wassenaar. The arrangement mandates that all members
require end-use certificates for each category of technology
and engage in pre-delivery consultations for exports of
controlled items to certain volatile regions, even though
such exports are not subject to a veto. Thus, China may
simply incorporate Wassenaar’s export controls into its
national laws without participating in the multilateral
review mechanism so as to not reveal pending arms sales
and thus open itself to international criticism.
China’s position on the international regime covering
missile exports, the MTCR, is somewhat similar to, but
slightly more formal than, its stance on the Wassenaar
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Arrangement. China is not a full member of the MTCR but
agreed in writing in 1992 to adhere to the regime’s original
guidelines and parameters. Yet, the nature of China’s
commitment to the MTCR and its subsequent
interpretations of that commitment remain a perennial
source of controversy in Sino-U.S. relations. The four
principal ambiguities within China’s position on the MTCR
are outlined below.
First, China’s original commitment to adhere to the
MTCR is unclear. Although the 1992 letter stating Beijing’s
commitment remains classified, Secretary James Baker
noted in his memoirs that during 1991 negotiations China,
objected to language saying that China “will observe” the MTCR
guidelines, demanding that it be changed to “intends to
observe.” By arguing forcefully for a less categorical pledge, it
seemed as though Qian Qichen was tactfully acknowledging the
possibility that some entity in China’s defense community
might cheat on this commitment.18

While Baker’s assessment may be pessimistic, it raises
questions about China’s fundamental commitment to
missile nonproliferation and the MTCR. Furthermore,
China’s original MTCR pledge is doubly unclear because
Beijing states that it has agreed to adhere to only “the
guidelines and parameters” of the MTCR and not the
agreement’s annex. The MTCR’s annex specifies all the
technologies controlled under the guidelines and
parameters and informs a member or adherent how to
interpret the MTCR guidelines and parameters in
determining whether an export is allowable. Without
acceptance of it, a meaningful and restrictive interpretation
of the MTCR becomes much more difficult to achieve. Also,
China has not yet adopted any export control regulations
that mirror its MTCR commitments and has not published
any laws which control the export of technologies listed in
the MTCR Annex.
Second, China has only agreed to adhere to the original
MTCR guidelines developed in 1987 and not the revised
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guidelines. In January 1993, the MTCR’s members
expanded the existing guidelines to cover all systems
intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction
regardless of range or payload. Adoption of this standard
would go a long way toward promoting stability and
signaling China’s commitment to using the MTCR as a
nonproliferation tool.
Third, aside from China’s actual commitments, Beijing’s
interpretation of its commitment to the MTCR and missile
nonproliferation represents an additional source of
confusion. China appears to adhere to the letter but not the
spirit of the MTCR. Chinese missile sales to Pakistan and
missile technology exports to Iran are the most common
examples of this interpretation. For example, in the view of
many analysts, China has argued that sales of complete
M-11 missiles to Pakistan do not breach the MTCR because
the M-11’s operational parameters (290 km/800 kg) do not
strictly conform to the MTCR’s original prohibitions to
which China agreed to adhere. Yet, this position is at odds
with the underlying goals of the MTCR, and it appears to
run counter to China’s 1992 commitment not to transfer
missile systems that would “undermine the peace, security,
or stability of the regions involved.” 19 In addition, China’s
continued missile technology sales to Iran, although
possibly consistent with the original MTCR guidelines, may
help Iran build longer range, non MTCR-compliant systems
and, thus, could further undermine regional stability in the
Middle East. One positive sign regarding China’s position
on the MTCR came in the June 1998 Joint Statement on
South Asia which was issued during the U.S.-China summit
meetings in Beijing. In this document, China pledged “to
prevent the export of equipment, materials or technology
that could in any way assist programs in India or Pakistan
for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of
delivering such weapons, and that, to this end, we will
strengthen our national export control systems.” This
commitment appears to resolve some uncertainty about
China’s willingness to halt further missile assistance to
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Pakistan (including MTCR Category II technologies) and
signals China’s commitment to begin developing legally
based export controls on MTCR controlled technologies.
Lastly, many of China’s nonproliferation pledges are not
publicly available, which complicates a fair and balanced
evaluation of them. As noted above, Beijing’s 1992 letter on
the MTCR is a classified document. In addition, China’s
recent assurances to halt cruise missile and nuclear
assistance to Iran were made privately and are not open to
evaluation. Indeed, subsequent statements (both on and off
the record) by Chinese officials call the U.S. interpretation
of these commitments into some question. Chinese steps to
improve the transparency of its nonproliferation
commitments would go a long way toward bolstering their
credibility.
CHINESE ARMS EXPORTS: THE PLAYERS20
The “players” involved in China’s arms exports can be
divided into two categories: (1) government agencies—new
and old—which participate in the export review process,
and (2) China’s military and defense industrial enterprises
which export military products. This section profiles these
institutions and their roles and seeks to assess their relative
influence. Much of this analysis is necessarily speculative
given the extensive and continuing changes within the
State Council bureaucracy, the PLA, and China’s defense
industrial complex.
Government Agencies.
Principal Actors. The main organizations consistently
involved in either or both arms export policymaking and
export control decisions are detailed below (see Appendix
III). The relative influence of any one of these organizations
is difficult to determine and can only be surmised based on
an accounting of their formal roles in past policy debates or
export control decisions.
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• The State Administrative Committee on Military
Products Trade (SACMPT). Abolished in mid-1998, the
SACMPT used to be the main government organization
responsible for overseeing controls on exports of military
products and related technologies. It was principally tasked
with drafting laws and policies governing arms transfers.
According to China’s 1995 white paper, the SACMPT
reported to both the State Council and the Central Military
Commission (CMC) and was comprised of “leading
personnel” from the MFA, COSTIND, the headquarters of
the General Staff, MOFTEC, and “other relevant
departments.” In this sense, the SACMPT functioned as an
interagency mechanism. The day-to-day administrative
responsibilities of the SACMPT were handled by the State
Bureau of Military Products Trade (SBMPT). Companies
were required to register with the SACMPT and their
contracts and export license applications had to be approved
before military goods could be legally exported. The 1995
white paper explained that the SACMPT only reviewed
applications for “major military transfers” and would then
forward them to the State Council and the CMC for
consideration. The new State Commission on Science,
Technology and Industry for National Defense has likely
assumed the responsibilities of the former SACMPT and the
SBMPT.
• The State Commission on Science, Technology, and
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). In March 1998,
COSTIND was formally abolished as a quasi-military
organization and then reconstituted under the State
Council during the organizational reforms announced at the
9th National People’s Congress. COSTIND, which used to
oversee the defense industrial base and was headed by
military personnel, was thus “civilianized” under the
reforms. The “new” COSTIND is headed by civilian leaders
and was formed by combining three parts of the
bureaucracy: the national defense departments of the
Ministry of Finance and the State Planning Commission
and the administrative offices of the former five defense
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industrial ministries (aviation, aerospace, shipbuilding,
nuclear, and ordnance.) The new COSTIND appears to be
tasked with implementing defense production directives
and continuing to oversee and enhance the civilian
production output of China’s defense plants. COSTIND has
become the administrative and regulatory point of contact
for China’s ten newly formed defense industrial enterprise
groups (jungong jituan gongsi). In other words, COSTIND
has assumed many of the government related functions of
the defense enterprises (e.g., formulating production
directives) while allowing the enterprises to manage
themselves by giving them authority to make
microeconomic decisions such as those concerning profits
and losses. 21
As an extension of these new responsibilities, COSTIND
may have assumed an important coordinating role for
export control decisions covering conventional military
products as well as other sensitive items such as nuclear
and missile-related technologies. Its export control
responsibilities stem from two recent changes. First, some
responsibilities of the former SACMPT and SBMPT have
reportedly been transferred to the Arms Trade Division
( Jun Mao Qu) within COSTIND’s International
Cooperation Department ( Guoji Hezuo Si)(see Appendix IV
for English-Chinese glossary of Chinese organizations).
This organization, in consultation with the PLA and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, will determine which military
goods are permissible for export. Second, COSTIND
inherited the China Atomic Energy Agency (CAEA) which
used to serve as the regulatory arm of the China National
Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) and was responsible for
reviewing pending nuclear exports. 22 Thus, COSTIND will
likely take the lead on some export control issues but it will
not possess ultimate authority on exports of military
products and related technologies because these decisions
are the result of an inter-agency review process. (This
process is detailed below.) 23
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• The General Armaments Department (GAD). 24 The
General Armaments Department was formed in April 1998
as part of the restructuring of China’s military industrial
complex initiated at the 9th National People’s Congress.
The GAD, one of four general staff level departments under
the control of the Central Military Commission, assumed
many of the military-related responsibilities of the former
COSTIND such as control over China’s military testing and
evaluation bases. Specifically, the GAD’s role in arms
control, nonproliferation, and export control
decisionmaking stems from three main activities.
First, the GAD now controls the “old” COSTIND’s arms
control division (within the Foreign Affairs Office) which
tracks for PLA the full spectrum of arms control and
nonproliferation issues including nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons proliferation, exports controls, and
nuclear testing issues. In addition, the China Defense
Science and Technology Information Center (CDSTIC),
which among other tasks conducts research on arms control
and nonproliferation topics, now reports to the GAD.
Formerly under the control of COSTIND, the CDSTIC is one
of the military’s leading centers for expertise and research
on arms control issues. Presumably, its research is
furnished to the office of the Chief of the General Staff for
use in interagency discussions and to PLA representatives
in the field at overseas embassies and at multilateral
disarmament organizations such as within the United
Nations.
Second, the GAD plays an active role in the export
control process. The GAD is believed to have a hand in
vetting pending exports of military products and certain
missile systems in conjunction with COSTIND and the
Foreign Ministry. In terms of nuclear exports, the GAD has
responsibility for controlling exports of nuclear materials.
Third, the GAD will have key inputs into Chinese arms
control and nonproliferation policies owing to the influence
of certain individuals. The GAD is led by General Cao
37

Gangchuan who headed the former COSTIND until its
“civilianization” in March 1998. Cao was previously deputy
chief of the General Staff and has played an important role
in some of China’s more well-known arms export cases, such
as the transfer of DF-3 intermediate range ballistic missiles
to Saudi Arabia in 1988. He was also appointed to the
Central Military Commission in October 1998, the
military’s highest policymaking body. General Qian
Shaojun, a nuclear physicist and senior member of the
GAD’s Science and Technology Committee, is the military’s
leading voice on arms control issues. According to Chinese
experts, Qian is one of the most knowledgeable and
influential arms control experts in China. Zhu Guangya,
another prominent physicist closely associated with China’s
nuclear weapons program, continues to head the GAD’s
Science and Technology Committee, but given his age, his
position is largely ceremonial.
Despite the influence of the GAD in arms export
decisions, the GAD may also have to coordinate with the
Foreign Affairs Office in the Ministry of National Defense
(MND). The MND’s FAO is responsible for all of the PLA’s
interactions with the international community (e.g.,
military-to-military relations) and as such it likely has some
role in Chinese military exports, especially if weapons are
drawn from PLA stocks. The MND’s Foreign Affairs Office is
reportedly trying to assert its authority over the newly
created GAD, and the FAO’s participation in arms export
decisionmaking could be one manifestation of this trend. 25
• The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The MFA’s role
in China’s arms control and nonproliferation affairs has
become much more formal in the past few years, and this
has augmented its influence in arms sales policymaking
and export control decisions. In September 1997, the MFA
established an Arms Control and Disarmament
Department which is one of the principal government actors
involved in formulating, articulating, and defending
China’s arms export policies. The Department has four
divisions, and the “Third Division” is exclusively devoted to
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covering conventional weapons issues such as China’s
position on anti-personnel landmines (APLs), missile
exports, and the MTCR, and China’s position on the
Wassenaar Arrangement. Its main responsibilities involve
providing policy guidance on these issues, and this division
participates in interagency consultations only on pending
exports of highly sensitive military products—such as
missile technology—which are related to China’s
nonproliferation commitments. 26 For other military
exports, the MFA’s regional departments are involved in
licensing decisions, given their knowledge of regional
politics and the potential impact of an arms deal on regional
stability. For example, the MFA’s Department of West
Asian and North African Affairs—not the Arms Control
Department—played the key role in China’s decision to sell
K-8E jet trainers to Egypt.
In the past, the MFA was reportedly not well informed
about China’s sensitive exports and often found out about
them after the fact. Establishment of this new department
and the promulgation of a formal licensing and approval
process for military exports makes it unlikely that the MFA
would not be informed of a pending arms export assuming
that the deal was officially authorized. Traditionally, the
MFA has taken a more conservative approach to China’s
conventional arms exports; this approach likely results
from the MFA role in assessing the impact of such exports
on China’s foreign relations, its international image, and
the extent to which such sales are consistent with China’s
existing arms control commitments. For example, one study
claimed the MFA opposed the DF-3 missile sale to Saudi
Arabia in 1988, arguing against the deal’s military
proponents that it would damage Sino-U.S. relations. A
second, more recent study claimed that while the MFA
supported the deal, it sought modifications in order to limit
the negative impact on China’s relations with the United
States and the Soviet Union. 27
• The Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation (MOFTEC). MOFTEC has nominal
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jurisdiction over most exports and has the authority to
regulate all foreign trade activities.
MOFTEC is responsible for issuing broad-based trade
laws governing China’s export controls such as the 1994
Foreign Trade Law. MOFTEC’s principal role in the export
control process is to participate in the license review process
and to issue the licenses. Specifically MOFTEC’s Science
and Technology Department normally participates in
interagency discussions about exports of controlled items
such as nuclear, nuclear dual-use, or chemical goods. (In the
nuclear and chemical areas, the China Atomic Energy
Agency and the Chemical Industry Administration take the
lead in vetting export applications and then refer them to
MOFTEC.) Interestingly, MOFTEC has no role at all in the
licensing process for military goods; MOFTEC does not even
issue the licenses after an interagency decision is made. 28
• General Administration of Customs (GAC). The
Customs Service is the enforcement bureau for export
controls. It is responsible for inspecting exports before they
leave China to ensure they have the appropriate export
licenses and transit documents. Exporters often first go to
the GAC before applying for a license in order to determine
if an item is controlled by China’s export control regulations.
The GAC operates a computer database listing controlled
items.
Leadership Oversight.
In addition to the six agencies noted above, three other
government organizations have a role in arms sales
decisions. All three are high-level agencies but are
considered secondary actors because they do not regularly
participate in policymaking or export control decisions
unless highly controversial and politically sensitive issues
are being considered. All of these organizations have much
more influence than the six cited above, but this influence is
often only wielded in unique circumstances.
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• The State Council (China’s Cabinet). Officials from the
State Council, CMC, COSTIND, and MOFTEC used to meet
occasionally to discuss military export policies. According to
China’s 1997 regulations on military exports, State Council
officials only review applications for “major military
exports” along with the CMC before a deal is approved. It is
unclear whether the State Council’s role has changed in the
wake of the 1998 restructuring effort.
• The Central Military Commission (CMC). Senior
officials from the CMC meet with State Council officials to
discuss export policies; China has stated that “major”
military exports and contracts must be examined and
approved by the CMC and the State Council.
• Military Products Export Leading Group.
Interpretations of this organization differ. According to
Chinese sources, this “leading group” is composed of very
senior government and military officials (e.g., China’s Vice
Premiers and CMC members) who meet on an ad hoc basis
to discuss the most controversial and sensitive weapons
exports. Given the high level nature of the group’s
participants, it only considers arms deals that are
internally controversial and politically sensitive for China’s
foreign relations. However, some Western scholars argue
that this small group is the same organization as the former
SACMPT but with a different name.
China’s Military and Defense-Industrial
Enterprises.
China’s weapons exporters are divided into two distinct
categories: military enterprises and defense-industrial
enterprises. 29 The military enterprises ( jundui qiye) were
originally owned and operated by the PLA and engaged in
both military and civilian commerce within China and
internationally. Only a small number of PLA entities are
trading companies involved in arms imports and exports
whereas the majority of PLA companies produce
nonmilitary goods; others produce nonlethal military
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equipment such as tents and uniforms. Before July 1998,
these PLA companies had formal and direct links to the
CMC’s General Departments (Staff, Logistics, Political, and
now Armaments), the Military Regions and Districts, and
the active duty and reserve forces of the Army, Air Force,
Navy, and the Strategic Rocket Forces. The enterprises paid
20-40 percent of their profits to the military’s General
Logistics Department (GLD), and “these monies [were] used
to improve the living standards of the troops by raising
wages, constructing new barracks, or supplementing
messing budgets.” 30 During the 1990s, in order to reduce
corruption and maintain discipline, the military
consolidated many of its enterprises into conglomerates
which reported to the CMC’s general departments or to the
heads of military regions.
By contrast, the defense-industrial enterprises ( jungong
qiye) report to the State Council and form the backbone of
China’s defense production system. These enterprises were
formerly divided among China’s five defense production
“ministries,” but in July 1999 these five were divided into
ten industrial enterprise groups, with two to each military
industry. This organizational bifurcation was part of the
government’s defense reform effort intended to inject
autonomy and competition into the operation of China’s
sluggish defense industrial sector. While these firms
produce military goods for the PLA under contract, they
have no formal links to the PLA. Many of these enterprises
produce a variety of civilian and military goods which are
marketed domestically and internationally. The profits
from these sales do not go to the PLA but are often
reinvested in the firms to improve their production
capabilities. 31
Military Enterprises.
Before mid-1998, the principal PLA enterprises engaged
in the export of military goods were Poly Technologies Ltd.
and to a lesser extent the China Xinxing Export-Import
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Corporation. In the wake of President Jiang’s call for the
PLA to end its commercial activities, it is not clear if any of
these companies will continue to export military products.
• Poly Technologies (Baoli) Ltd. Founded in 1984, Poly
Technologies used to be the main commercial export arm of
the Equipment Division of the General Staff Department
(GSD). Since its establishment, Poly Technologies has sold
millions of dollars worth of weapons from the PLA’s surplus
stocks. In 1987, Poly Technologies’ sales peaked with
exports worth about $500 million. Its customers included
Thailand, Burma, Iran, and Pakistan. The highest profile
deals Poly Technologies conducted include Silkworm
missile sales to Iran in the 1980s and the 1988 sale of DF-3
medium-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia. Poly
Technologies reportedly received a commission for its arms
exports but the majority of the profits were repatriated to
the General Logistics Department to subsidize the PLA’s
budget. 32
As the global arms market became more competitive in
the 1990s, Poly Technologies diversified into a wide variety
of commercial ventures including hotels, real estate
development, casino operations, and other businesses. Poly
also operates several subsidiaries in the United States and
other countries as well. Poly’s operations in the United
States include PTK International, Dynasty Holding Co.,
and Poly U.S.A Inc., among others. 33
In the past, Poly Technologies was known to be closely
tied through family relations to various senior members of
the Chinese government. These ties to high-level
government officials and its direct military links made it
difficult for the MFA to control Poly’s arms export activities.
Yet, the extent to which this situation persists is unclear,
given the growth and institutionalization of China’s arms
control and nonproliferation community in the 1990s and
the recent divestiture of the PLA from commercial
activities.
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• China Xinxing (Group) General Corporation. Xinxing
is one of five commercial enterprises operated by the
General Logistics Department of the PLA. It conducts both
military and civilian business activity but with a greater
reliance on the latter. It operates several subsidiary
companies which are involved in medical science and
technology, mining products, chemicals, real estate
development, car production, and shipping activities.
Located throughout China, these companies control over
100 industrial plants and mining enterprises. The military
and civilian items the Xinxing Group produces for China’s
domestic market include uniforms, textiles, leather goods,
footwear, machinery, steel, and chemicals. Its international
sales arm is called the China Xinxing Export-Import
Corporation, and it exports mainly nonmilitary items such
as truck parts, cars, touring buses, salt, iron, steel, mining
ores, and a variety of other goods. It exports military
supplies and logistics equipment such as uniforms, bedding,
shoes and boots, implements, backpacks, and tents. 34 The
Xinxing Group also operates a known subsidiary in the
United States, Xin Xing U.S.A., and other operations may
exist as well.
Defense-Industrial Enterprises.
China’s defense industrial enterprises—covering the
aviation, aerospace, ordnance, and shipbuilding
sectors—normally conduct arms exports through trading
firms which function as their window to the international
market. These trade arms are not involved in military
production but rather are licensed by the government to
conduct military exports and are independent of the PLA;
interestingly, during the 1980s and 1990s some of these
enterprises actually competed with PLA companies for
arms sale contracts with developing countries. There are
currently five key firms involved in conventional weapons
sales. Details on them and their past export activities are
provided below. In July 1999, China divided its five large
defense industrial group corporations into 10 industrial
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enterprise groups. Despite this bifurcation, so far there is no
indication that each of the enterprise groups will establish
its own trading firms. The ones detailed below continue to
serve their corresponding industries.
• China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO).
Founded in 1984, NORINCO is the successor organization
to China’s Fifth Ministry of Machine Building which
oversaw the production of tanks and other armored
vehicles, artillery, munitions, and small arms. NORINCO
was established during an early reorganization of China’s
defense industrial system which sought to “corporatize”
China’s five defense industries to make them more efficient.
Currently, NORINCO operates 157 large and
medium-sized companies employing 800,000 people, as well
as 30 R&D centers and more than a dozen technical colleges.
NORINCO also operates more that 80 overseas subsidiaries
including some 11 companies in the United States. 35
Beginning in the early 1980s as PLA orders declined and
defense producers were officially encouraged to “convert,”
many of NORINCO’s factories diversified into producing a
variety of civilian goods. NORINCO’s factories now market
vehicles and vehicle motors, chemical industry products,
mechanical products, light industrial products, and optical
and electric products. In terms of military goods, NORINCO
develops, produces, and markets a variety of products,
including fire control systems, sighting and aiming systems,
and nuclear, chemical and biological protection equipment.
Its most prominent military-related exports are “civil
firearms” and ammunition. During the 1980s, NORINCO
sold thousands of tanks, artillery, and armored personnel
carriers to China’s then-traditional clients like Iran, Iraq,
Pakistan, and Thailand. In the late 1980s and early 1990s,
demand for NORINCO’s weapons took a sharp downturn
due to the poor quality of its military equipment combined
with increased competition from Russian weapons
exporters.
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• China Precision Machinery Import-Export
Corporation (CPMIEC). 36 Established in the early 1980s,
CPMIEC is involved in missile and missile technology
exports; it is the prime marketer of China’s M-series
missiles including the M-9/DF-15 and the M-11/DF-11.
CPMIEC reportedly can negotiate sales of nearly all
missiles and technologies produced by the China Aerospace
Corporation, except strategic systems. CPMIEC also
markets liquid- and solid-fueled rocket engines. CPMIEC
imports and exports high technology equipment, including
defensive weapon systems, space equipment, satellite
technologies and products, precision machinery, optical
instruments, and electronic products.
The types of missiles CPMIEC offers for export include:
• Surface-to-surface missiles: M-9/DF-15, M-11/DF-11;
• Cruise missiles: SY-1 (CSS-N-1), YJ-1/C-801,
YJ-2/C-802, HY-1 (CSS-N-2/CSSC-2), HY-2/C-201
(CSSC-3), HY-4/C-201 (CSSC-7), C-601 (CAS-1);
• Surface-to-air missiles: HQ-2 (B, J), CSA-N-2, FM-80,
LY-60, KS-1, Vanguard (shoulder-launched); and,
• Free rocket systems: WS-1.
CPMIEC was sanctioned in May 1991 and August 1993 by
the United States for its involvement in M-11 exports to
Pakistan.
According to a company brochure, CPMIEC is:
A nationwide foreign trade organization which combines trade
with industry and technology. As a subsidiary of China
Aerospace Corporation, CPMIEC has the status of a legal
person and independently carries out import and export
business.
Backed by the immense economic and technology base and the
strong production capability of the space industry in China,
supported by ample funds, advanced facilities and a large
number of well experienced experts from the research and
development institutes and plants, CPMIEC has adequate
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capacity for research, design and manufacture of various
high-precision equipment and products of high technology.
CPMIEC deals with import and export business in high
technology, including defensive weapon systems, space
equipment, satellite techniques and products, special
equipment, precision machinery, optical instruments,
electronic products, etc. CPMIEC accepts orders for
processing with customer’s drawings, materials, and samples,
engages in joint research and development, co-production,
joint venture, technology transfer and compensation trade,
contracts for the design and construction of industrial and civil
projects, consultations of technical and foreign trade business
information and other forms of trade activities.
Since CPMIEC was set up in 1980, it has established a wide
range of business relations with dozens of countries and
regions throughout the world. In business activities, CPMIEC
has always been honoring its contractual obligations, keeping
the commitments, and seeking high efficiencies. It has also
been exporting various products with reasonable prices,
superior quality and reliable performance, together with good
after-sales services and long-term supply of spare parts.

The company brochure also defined the scope of
CPMIEC’s services. They include:
• Export of weapon systems;
• Design and construction of test range, technical and
firing sites; modification and upgrading and maintenance of
foreign weapon systems; and,
• Export of civilian products and technologies converted
from military production; and joint venture, co-production,
and manufacture with supplied materials, designs, or
samples.
CPMIEC’s engineering design and construction services
include:
• Delivery of technical and firing sites;
• Air and sea defense missile test ranges;
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• Special facilities for research and design, simulation,
CAD and CAM, microwave testing, motor testing, antenna
testing, non-destructive testing, static and dynamic
strength testing, full-scale testing, information, telemetry,
meteorology, computer and material science;
• Special production facilities, including micro and
precision machinery, composite materials, chemical
milling, chemical deposition, heat isostatic pressing,
quality control, environment control, microelectronics,
autoclave and vacuum deposition; and,
• Military and civilian buildings for general purposes.
China Great Wall Industry Corporation (CGWIC). 37
China Great Wall is a subsidiary of the China Aerospace
Corporation (CASC), which controls all of China’s research,
development, testing, and evaluation of missiles, space
launch services, and related equipment. CGWIC imports
and exports some missile technology, space technology and
equipment, space launch services, precision machinery,
electronics, instruments, and meters. It is mainly involved
in providing satellite launch services and has been engaged
in these activities since the mid-1980s. CGWIC is currently
developing improved versions of the CZ-2, CZ-3, and CZ-4
families of space launch vehicles (SLVs) to augment China’s
ability to place large payloads into geosynchronous orbit. 38
CGWIC was sanctioned twice (as a subsidiary of CASC), in
May 1991 and August 1993, by the United States for its
involvement in exports of M-11 missiles to Pakistan.
• China National Aero-Technology Import-Export
Corporation Group (CATIC Group). The CATIC Group was
a subsidiary organization of the Aviation Industries
Corporation of China (AVIC), and is now responsible for
trading military and civilian aircraft. The CATIC Group is
not a production entity but rather sells military and civilian
aircraft, engines, missiles, and other airborne equipment.
For a few years in the early 1990s, CATIC was the sole
organization within AVIC which could negotiate for the
import/export of AVIC products. CATIC negotiated the
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deals and was responsible for getting the products from the
factory to the customer; CATIC also provided after-sales
maintenance contracts. However, this changed with the
adoption of the factory manager responsibility system
because individual factories began negotiating contracts
themselves and did not go not through CATIC. The factories
still relied on CATIC to ship the items abroad. CATIC also
faced competition from the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) which
undermined CATIC’s profit-making ability. The PLAAF
began competing with CATIC for post-sale maintenance
contracts through its Aeronautical Engineering
Department (AED) which had an office in Poly
Technologies. Drawing on over 20 overhaul and
maintenance factories, the Air Force’s AED presented
CATIC with real competition in the area of maintenance
contracts. 39
Over the past two decades, CATIC has been responsible
for the export of the F-6 and F-7 light fighters, the K-8/FT-7
jet trainer, the F-8II fighter-bomber, and the A-5 ground
attack aircraft. These systems have been sold to countries
such as Iran, Pakistan, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. One of
CATIC’s most recent deals was the 1998 agreement with
Pakistan to co-develop the Super-7/FC-1 aircraft. In
addition, CATIC has sold air-to-air, ship-to-ship, and
land-to-ship cruise missiles and related components
produced in AVIC factories. Some of the specific missile
systems CATIC has exported include the PL-5B, PL-7,
PL-9, FL-1 (CSS-N-1 Mod 2), FL-2 (CSS-NX-5), and FL-7
cruise missiles. CATIC may also have played a role in
exporting Silkworm missiles to Iran which were possibly
produced at the Nanchang Aircraft Factory.
In recent years AVIC and CATIC have not fared well
economically due to a significant drop in the demand for
their products, within and outside China. The Chinese
government has preferred to buy civilian aircraft from
Boeing and Airbus rather than from its domestic
manufacturers. In the military realm, the PLA in 1994
concluded a deal with Russia for the purchase of 52
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Sukhoi-27 complete aircraft and a joint production deal to
assemble and produce as many as 200 of the aircraft. This
deal came about in light of AVIC’s inability to produce a
fighter with equivalent capabilities. Su-27s assembled in
Chinese factories conducted their first flight tests in early
1999. China has a poor record of bringing prototypes into
serial production, and the delay in assembling the Su-27
aircraft is one example of endemic problems in China’s
aviation industry. Interestingly, the Su-27 project merely
involved assembling materials from a “kit” purchased from
Russia, but even then the project took several years before
the first flight test occurred. As for future related exports
derived from the Su-27, one can imagine the difficulties and
delays involved if China sought to integrate Russian
aircraft technologies into a domestic weapons system.
Given AVIC’s systemic difficulties producing military
aircraft and the resulting decline in domestic orders for
Chinese fighters, it is likely that CATIC will increasingly
look to the international market to sell its military aircraft.
For example, the main reason CATIC is co-developing the
Super-7 fighter with Pakistan is that the PLA Air Force
refused to buy the aircraft; co-development will help to
reduce the research and development costs of the fighter.
Aircraft exports will be used to generate hard currency for
the purchase of advanced production technologies which, in
turn, could help modernize the production capabilities of
AVIC factories as part of China’s effort to develop an
indigenous capacity to produce advanced military aircraft.
• China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation (CSTC). 40
CSTC is the trading arm for China’s shipbuilding industry.
CSTC is principally responsible for the export of items
produced in the CSSC’s 75 large- and medium-sized
shipyards, 57 marine equipment manufacturing plants,
and the 36 R&D and design institutes. The CSTC has
marketed military vessels, commercial ships, marine
equipment like diesel engines, and some nonmarine items
all over the world. It has offices in Hong Kong, Moscow, Los
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Angeles, Hamburg, Bangkok, London, Athens, and
Islamabad. 41
CSTC military products include a wide mix of platforms
currently used by the PLA Navy such as Luda and Luhu
class destroyers, Jiangwei and Jianghu class frigates,
missile corvettes, missile fast attack craft, patrol boats,
landing craft, replenishment ships, and anti-smuggling
boats. According to CSTC, “Various types of naval vessels
can also be designed and built according to the
requirements of foreign navies and have been exported to
many countries.” 42 In the past the CSTC has exported
Jianghu class frigates to Thailand and Pakistan, Hudong
class fast attack craft to Iran, as well as various patrol boats
and landing ships to Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.
The CSTC’s ability to increase its exports of military vessels
is an open question, however. Few countries have ordered
major warships such as frigates or destroyers in the last 5
years, and requests for smaller naval vessels have been
declining as well. Although the shipbuilding industry’s
ability to design and produce better quality vessels has
vastly improved because of its growing commercial
business, it still lacks the ability to equip these ships with
advanced weapons technologies and propulsion and
navigation systems. As a result, many of China’s former
clients like Thailand have shifted to buying naval ships and
naval weapons systems from non-Chinese sources.
CHINESE ARMS EXPORTS: THE PROCESS43
Formal procedures.
Prior to 1997, China’s procedures governing the export of
military products and related technologies were
unpublished and ambiguous. In recent years, there has
been much progress in this area as China has sought to
formalize and institutionalize its arms export review
process. Yet, many uncertainties remain. China’s economic
reform policies—which emphasize decentralization, fiscal
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autonomy, and foreign trade—have created conditions
which make controlling military exports all the more
difficult. The principal legal framework for export controls
was laid out in the 1994 Foreign Trade Law (FTL). This law
included several export control-related provisions: it
provided the authority to prohibit exports of items for
national security reasons; it permitted Beijing to restrict
exports based on China’s obligations to international
treaties; and it required Chinese companies to apply for a
license to export goods controlled by international treaties
and conventions. These provisions were very general and
did not identify distinct procedures or define control lists for
vetting exports of nuclear, chemical, missile, or military
products. By 1995, the Chinese government acknowledged
the establishment of the SACMPT and described some
procedures specifically related to controls on military
exports in its white paper on arms control and
disarmament; yet, no formal law governing military exports
was issued for another 2 years.
Indeed, China’s illegal shipment of 2,000 AK-47s to the
United States in early 1997 testifies to the lax control on
some military exports in China prior to the promulgation of
this law. The executive director of Poly Technologies, one of
the PLA’s largest arms exporters and formerly controlled by
the General Staff Department, said on the record that the
GSD is not always required to authorize transfers of small
arms, even when the weapons are taken from stockpiles
controlled by the General Logistics Department. 44
China’s formal process for vetting and permitting
exports of military products and related technologies was
publicly outlined in the October 1997 Regulations on Export
Control of Military Items.45 (See Appendix II.) These
regulations require Chinese arms exporters to receive
several different types of government approval before a deal
is authorized. Depending on the type of military products
being transferred, a variety of government organizations
may participate in these approval processes. First,
according to the 1997 regulations, a Chinese company
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seeking to export military products must apply to the State
Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade
(SACMPT) for official registration and authorization as a
“military trading company.” (See Appendix V for flow chart
showing China’s export control system for military goods.)
The SACMPT’s administrative arm, the State Bureau of
Military Products Trade, handles administrative and
day-to-day affairs of the SACMPT. According to the 1997
law, the SACMPT has formulated application procedures
for authorization, but they are not yet publicly available. In
addition, the SACMPT is responsible for authorizing other
companies as military export transportation agents “to
handle export transportation and other related businesses.”
No companies other than state registered transportation
companies can participate in the transit of military
products out of China. The procedures for this latter
authorization also are not publicly available. 4 6
Furthermore, as noted above, the SACMPT and its
subsidiary bureau no longer exist, and it is currently
uncertain how this change and the likely shift of
responsibilities to COSTIND has affected the operation of
the 1997 regulations.
Currently, there are several Chinese companies which
are authorized to export military products and related
technologies, but the total number is not currently known.
As noted above, some of the most well-known arms
exporters are NORINCO, China Xinxing (Group) General
Corporation, Poly Technologies Inc., China Great Wall
Industry Corporation, the China Precision Machinery
Import-Export Corporation, China National
Aero-Technology Import-Export Corporation, and the
China Shipbuilding Trading Corporation. Interestingly,
this number greatly exceeds the few companies authorized
to export controlled nuclear and chemical materials,
equipment, and technologies. Only two companies, the
China Atomic Energy Agency and SINOCHEM, are
authorized to sell nuclear items; similarly, only two Chinese
chemical companies, SINOCHEM and China Haohua
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Chemical Industry Group, are permitted to export
controlled chemicals. All other businesses in China must go
through these companies to export controlled nuclear or
chemical products. 47
Once a company has been designated as an official
military trading company, the next step is to engage China’s
military export licensing system. The licensing process
involves two steps: contract approval and licensing
authorization. First, a company must submit a provisional,
unsigned export contract to the State Bureau of Military
Products Trade for review and approval. The SBMPT
normally reviews these contracts itself, but in certain
circumstances it consults with “the relevant departments”
of the State Council and the CMC. The SBMPT has 15 days
to approve the contract in order for it to be considered valid
and for the export review process to continue. The 1997
regulations also require companies to append “certification
documents” from the recipient countries to the application
for contract approval. The regulations do not specify what
types of certification documents are needed, but one
possibility is an end-use certificate. Once an export contract
is approved by the SBMPT and subsequently signed by the
Chinese and the foreign company, the next step involves
applying for a military export license. This latter step
appears somewhat perfunctory and less complicated than
the previous one because it involves attaching the approved
export contract to a license application. The SBMPT, not
MOFTEC, will then issue or deny a license within 5 days. 48
This license is required before China’s Customs Service can
legally permit military items to be exported.
By contrast, exports of “major” military products are
first reviewed by the SACMPT and then submitted to higher
level offices in the State Council and the CMC for
approval. 49 If a pending export is politically sensitive and
potentially controversial, then the issue can be reviewed by
the Military Products Export Leading Small Group. This
high-level government group is comprised of very senior
government and Communist Party officials such as the
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members of the Central Committee’s Political Bureau.
Given their senior status, this group meets infrequently to
consider only the most controversial arms exports which
could have a negative impact on China’s foreign relations. 50
The 1997 regulations also stipulate that individuals can
not export military goods, and the law sets a series of six
standards to which military export companies must
conform in their dealings. Companies must not:
• Endanger national security or social and public
interests;
• Supplant competitors with unfair competitive means;
• Infringe upon intellectual property rights protected by
the national laws;
• Forge, alter, fraudulently obtain or transfer arms
export project approval documents, contract approval
documents, licenses, valid certificates from recipient
countries, and other documents;
• Exceed the scope of businesses defined and approved
by the authorities; or,
• Engage in other conduct that violates the laws and
administrative regulations. 51
Violations of any of these six standards can result in the
closing down of the military trading company, and
violations of any of the steps in the licensing processes can
result in the revocation of an export license. In addition, any
and all violations are considered criminal offenses and can
be prosecuted. This stipulation also applies to the staff of
the military trading companies to prevent them from
engaging in illegal conduct such as accepting bribes.
Despite the seeming comprehensiveness of these
regulations, there are two major areas of uncertainty in the
law which raise serious questions about its ability to
effectively control exports of military products and related
technologies. First, these regulations do not specify what, if
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any, “control lists” the Chinese agencies refer to when
reviewing a license application. The United States, for
example, uses the Commerce Control List (CCL) and the
State Department Munitions List (ML) but no equivalent
seems to exists in China for military items. MOFTEC
officials claim that such a list exists for missiles and related
technologies (i.e., MTCR Annex items), but one has never
been openly published. In the areas of nuclear and chemical
exports, China has already incorporated international lists,
such as the ones used by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and
the Chemical Weapons Convention, into its existing export
regulations. No equivalent international list covering
military products has been adopted by the Chinese. One
possibility is that Chinese officials already use the two
Wassenaar lists when reviewing license applications, even
though neither was referenced in the 1997 export control
regulations. MOFTEC’s recently published The Catalogue
of Technology Whose Export Is Banned or Restricted in
China may represent a first attempt to link the
international munitions and dual-use technology lists used
by Wassenaar to China’s existing law covering military
exports.
The second uncertainty in this law is the extent of
interagency consultation during the contract authorization
and license review process. The SACMPT, as described in
the 1995 white paper, is composed of officials from the MFA,
COSTIND, MOFTEC, and the PLA General Staff. Yet, the
1997 regulations do not specify when in the process these
various agencies voice their input or how often. Do they help
to review each license? Do they also provide input when
reviewing license applications for only sensitive exports? Or
do they only participate in the formulation and revision of
regulations covering military exports? In the nuclear area,
specialized agencies such as the China Atomic Energy
Agency normally take the lead in the licensing process,
while informally consulting with others such as MOFTEC,
military officials, or the Foreign Ministry when questions
arise. (MOFTEC will then issue a license if approved.) This
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informal consultation process, which is common practice in
planned economies, may constitute the extent of
regularized interagency discussion of license applications
related to military exports. 52 These uncertainties become
even greater given the apparent abolition of SACMPT and
the possible shift of its responsibilities to COSTIND.
Despite these ambiguities, the MFA has likely become a
more influential voice in discussions about China’s arms
export policies and decisions about specific sensitive
weapons exports. The MFA recently established a
Department of Arms Control and Disarmament under the
leadership of Ambassador Sha Zukang, which has an entire
division of some 10-12 officials devoted to covering
conventional weapons issues. Although the majority of their
work deals with China’s participation in international
regimes, this concentration of expertise on conventional
arms issues within the MFA could be very influential in
interagency debates and consultations. Moreover, the
professionalism, experience, and trust which Ambassador
Sha has built within the Chinese decisionmaking structure
on these issues will lend him and his new department
greater political leverage. This professionalism is
especially important at a time of transition in Chinese
nonproliferation and arms control policies.
The MFA’s overall influence on arms control and
nonproliferation topics appears to depend on the nature of
the issues being debated in Beijing. For example,
Ambassador Sha’s office has taken the lead on voicing
China’s opposition to U.S. national missile defense and
theater missile defense programs. Sha has been unusually
outspoken on this issue (for a Chinese diplomat); he has
given interviews to several major U.S. newspapers, even
though the official Sino-U.S. nonproliferation dialogue has
been frozen since May 1999. Meanwhile few PLA officials
such as China’s defense minister have made statements on
the missile defense issue, even though it is ostensibly a
military topic. A similar situation exists regarding China’s
participation in the MTCR. By contrast, the PLA took the
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lead on drafting and editing China’s 1998 defense white
paper, with MFA officials providing limited input on
sections directly relevant to their responsibilities.
Government Reorganization and Downsizing.
In March 1998, China adopted a series of policies which
have resulted in the downsizing and restructuring of much
of the bureaucracy, including the defense industrial sector.
These changes within China’s defense industries raise
uncertainties in the short-to-medium term about the proper
functioning of military export controls. In the long term,
however, these changes—if properly implemented—may
create a more organized and rational system for controlling
military exports. Four important changes in particular will
affect the processes and players involved in arms sales
decisions.
The first major organizational change directly
influencing China’s controls on military exports was the
dissolution of the SACMPT in March 1998. As of early 2000,
Chinese authorities have not yet officially stated which
government agency (new or old), or combination of existing
agencies, will assume SACMPT’s responsibilities for
overseeing the control of military exports. 53 A Chinese
Foreign Ministry official suggested the changes may be
limited to a shift in the administrative agents specified in
the 1997 regulations, while the licensing processes outlined
in the law will remain fixed. 54 The 1997 regulations have not
yet been revised to reflect these organizational changes,
however. As noted above, the administrative
responsibilities of the former SACMPT have possibly been
assumed by the new COSTIND. This shift of responsibilities
would be consistent with COSTIND’s emerging role as an
administrative and regulatory organization governing
China’s defense enterprises. Under this scenario, the
successor organization to the SACMPT would only report to
the State Council, which represents a shift from the
SACMPT’s previous position as a quasi-military
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organization reporting to both the CMC and the State
Council. Indeed, Liu Jibin, the new civilian head of
COSTIND, was quoted in a 1999 Washington Post article as
saying that his organization would assume control of
weapons imports and exports. He noted that China’s
defense corporations are being eased out of policy decisions
related to arms exports and imports. 55
Adding to its growing export control profile, the new
COSTIND also assumed control of two subsidiary bureaus,
the State Aerospace Bureau and the China Atomic Energy
Agency, whose principal role is to oversee and regulate
China’s aerospace and nuclear industries. These
organizations were formerly part of two larger industrial
groups: the CASC and China National Nuclear Corporation
(CNNC). 56 As part of their responsibilities, these two
bureaus may be expected to vet export license applications
for their respective industries. This trend suggests that
China’s other defense industries may follow suit by
separating their administrative offices and housing them in
the new COSTIND. 57 Indeed, this development may be
positive for nonproliferation because the placement of these
regulatory bodies within the new COSTIND separates them
from corporate interests which rank exports among their
principal goals.
Second, following the reconstitution of COSTIND, the
GAD was formed in April 1998. This new PLA general
staff-level department draws together the uniformed
military from COSTIND with the General Staff
Department’s Equipment Directorate, as well as with other
military equipment-related offices from other parts of the
General Staff system. The GAD’s main role is to oversee the
development, procurement, supply, maintenance, and the
life-cycle management of the military’s weapons systems.
The GAD was also tasked with overseeing the PLA’s testing
and training bases such as the Xichang satellite launch
center. 58 The GAD will also have a limited role in vetting
some military-related exports but will be a key PLA voice in
arms control negotiations affecting China’s military
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capabilities. The specific roles and influences of the GAD in
arms export policymaking were discussed in the previous
section.
Third, and beyond these specific reorganizations, the
government adopted a series of policies in March 1998
aimed at downsizing and streamlining its bureaucracy.
These decisions will have limited effects on China’s export
control system, although the staffs of ministries involved in
export control administration have been cut significantly.
MOFTEC’s personnel, for example, were cut by 45 percent,
and the Science and Technology Department—which
reviews applications for “sensitive exports”—was reduced
by 30 percent. 59 China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs was
required to reduce its staff by only 26 percent (not the initial
55 percent requested by the State Council), and its Arms
Control and Disarmament Department has actually
expanded.
The arms control community in China is very small, and
very few diplomats have developed a specialization in such
issues. As a result, much of the MFA’s arms control staff is
young and relatively inexperienced with specific issues.
Most staffers have received little, if any, formal training on
arms control and nonproliferation issues in Chinese
universities or diplomatic academies and have had to learn
“on the job”; the youngest members of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Department staff are often hired simply
because of their strong English language skills. Given these
constraints, the MFA’s input on export controls issues is
normally limited to participation in the formulation of
policies; MFA officials do not normally review license
applications, unless they are deemed particularly sensitive.
The fourth recent change affecting China’s arms exports
policies and decisionmaking processes is the
decommercialization of the military and law enforcement
agencies. In July 1998, Jiang Zemin issued an edict calling
for the PLA and the People’s Armed Police (PAP) to divest
themselves from their business activities. According to
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some estimates, the PLA owned and operated
10,000-15,000 enterprises engaged in a variety of
commercial ventures from transportation, vehicle
production, and hotel operation to real estate development
and telecommunications. The Chinese leadership took this
step to reduce corruption and smuggling within PLA ranks
as part of a broader effort to professionalize and modernize
its military. A special office was established within the
State Economic and Trade Commission to coordinate the
hand-over of military enterprises. This office will take over
and manage the military’s largest enterprises whereas
provincial and local governments will assume control of the
smaller enterprises. The hand-over will reportedly occur in
three phases: preparation, transfer, and restructuring. The
transfer process was reportedly completed by December 20,
1998. 60 U.S. experts indicate that by early 2000 some
4,000-5,000 PLA companies were civilianized, but that the
PLA retains control of some 10,000 smaller enterprises. 61
The potential effects on China’s arms exports are mixed.
On the one hand, the PLA’s divestiture from business
activities could renew incentives for illegal arms exporting
in order to generate the income lost as a result of the
decommercialization effort. It is generally accepted that the
profits from the PLA’s business activities contributed to the
PLA’s operating budget, especially within certain units.
With this money no longer being generated, PLA units,
especially ones based in provinces far from Beijing, may
seek to export weapons from surplus stockpiles to make up
for the funding shortfall. 62 To be sure, Premier Zhu Rongji,
China’s economic reform czar, promised to compensate the
PLA for its lost income. According to discussions with senior
officials of the GLD, compensation will amount to
approximately 3.2 billion renminbi per year (about $400
million) or about 3 percent of China’s officially declared
military budget for 1997. Yet, it is not entirely clear these
funds will be sufficient to cover the defense budget’s annual
shortfall. PLA leaders were reportedly very upset with
Zhang Wannian, the vice-chairman of the CMC, for
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accepting Zhu’s compensation offer before consulting with
them about the PLA’s actual financial needs. 63
On the other hand, the military’s decommercialization
and restructuring efforts may have broken certain
bureaucratic linkages which could hinder the ability of
current and former PLA companies to export arms.
Specifically, these policies may have severed ties between
(1) former PLA enterprises and PLA departments (e.g.,
GSD), and (2) PLA enterprises and China’s defense
industrial enterprises. With the creation of the GAD and a
more centralized control over China’s weapons stocks, it is
unclear whether former PLA enterprises such as Poly
Technologies will be able to draw from PLA stockpiles in
order to sell weapons abroad, as it did in the past.
Also, it is not certain whether formal relations will
persist between former PLA companies like Poly
Technologies and defense industrial enterprises like
NORINCO; these channels used to be crucial to Poly’s arms
exports. In the past, Poly requested that NORINCO
overproduce weapons for the PLA stockpile in order for Poly
to export the excess items. However, if NORINCO’s
production decisions are now made within the new
COSTIND and monitored by the GAD, then companies like
Poly may no longer be able to influence production rates in
order to facilitate their arms exports. To be sure, Poly
Technologies still holds much influence in Chinese military
circles and this power may allow it to remain a prominent
arms exporter. Poly’s influence results from its
long-standing personal relationships with officials in the
PLA’s military supply system and the central role Poly has
played in negotiating arms imports from Russia. In the
latter case, Poly’s connections with Russian arms exporters
are viewed as crucial to China’s continued access to Russian
weapons systems. For this reason alone, Poly
Technologies—despite its official break with the PLA—will
retain its strong connections with PLA officials involved in
weapons imports and exports. 64
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Furthermore, as a result of the divestiture of the PLA,
many of the newly civilianized companies may no longer
have financial incentives to maintain a close relationship
with the PLA and therefore might not be involved in arms
exports. In China’s more competitive and profit-driven
business environment, arms dealing has likely become an
unappealing pursuit for Chinese companies. Weapons sales
are often controversial and have become increasingly
complicated to conduct, given China’s growing export
control system, the government’s nonproliferation
commitments, and stiff international competition.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSIONS

Despite the declining volume of Chinese arms exports,
China’s shrinking market share, and the possibility that its
arms exports control process will become rational and
effective, Chinese arms transfers will continue to be an
issue of concern for U.S. policymakers in the coming years.
China’s past willingness to introduce certain military
products such as cruise missiles and ballistic missile
technologies into regions of U.S. concern (e.g., the Middle
East and South Asia) suggests that Chinese arms exports
will remain of interest to U.S. officials, policy analysts, and
military planners. Over the years, China has established
strong political and technical relationships with the
governments and other entities in these countries which
can easily facilitate continued and possibly upgraded arms
exports to those regions.
To be sure, China has made various pledges to halt
exports of missiles and related technologies to South Asia
and the Middle East. Yet, China’s current commitments are
mostly bilateral, political promises made in the context of
U.S.-China bargaining; they do not appear to be rock-solid
and unequivocal. In the past, China has sought to
circumvent its commitments by following the letter of its
obligations, but not the spirit of them, or by suggesting that
Beijing’s interpretations of its commitments differ from
Washington’s. Thus, Beijing’s commitments may rest more
on political understandings about U.S.-China relations
than on apolitical contractual obligations. As such, a major
downturn in Sino-U.S. relations could lead Beijing to
overturn commitments and enter upon a new round of arms
exports.
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Such a scenario is not unlikely given the range of
Sino-U.S. differences, especially over security issues like
Taiwan. China continues to link its restraint in arms
exports to diminishing U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, and
China could use its arms exports to particular countries
(e.g., Iran) as leverage in bilateral debates over
Taiwan-related issues. Indeed, China’s vehement
opposition to current U.S. proposals to provide TMD
technology to East Asia partners, especially to Taiwan,
could trigger a new round of arms exports from Beijing. 1
Chinese officials have already indicated they consider TMD
sales to Taiwan to be a form of missile proliferation which
may lead Beijing to reconsider its existing missile
nonproliferation commitments. One possible scenario is
that China could restart its cruise missile sales to Iran,
considering that its previous ban on such exports came in
response to significant U.S. pressure and is not part of
China’s international nonproliferation commitments.
Further complicating these issues are the ambiguities
and lack of transparency surrounding China’s official
policies and processes related to arms exports. China’s
currently declared policies on arms transfers and its
regulations covering the review of pending exports are
unclear on several points. The principles which guide
China’s official arms export policy are sufficiently flexible to
justify almost any export on the grounds that it contributes
to the legitimate defense requirements of the recipient. In
addition, the 1997 regulations covering military product
exports are vague on key points such as the numbers and
types of military organizations which can export arms, the
nature and extent of interagency review of pending military
exports, and—most importantly—which items are covered
by the regulations. In the aggregate, these ambiguities are
particularly worrisome because they can provide
opportunities for Chinese entities to illicitly export military
goods without the knowledge of central government
authorities.
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Indeed, this may already be occurring. In early 1999,
reports surfaced that a Chinese company had sold some
type of short-range missile/long-range artillery system to
Armenia. In response to protests of the deal by Azerbaijan’s
Foreign Ministry, two senior Chinese officials—China’s
Ambassador to Armenia Zhu Zhaoshun and Vice Foreign
Minister Wang Yingfan—admitted that Beijing did not
know about or approve the deal, and that the central
government has had difficulty controlling the activities of
private Chinese arms exporters despite the 1997 law. Yet,
the Chinese officials pledged that similar incidents would
not occur in the future. 2
Furthermore, the ongoing reorganization of China’s
government, especially within the defense industrial
organizations, has injected a new and possibly more
troublesome variable into the arms export equation. These
changes call into question the continuing relevance of the
past regulations as well as the nature of the export review
process. It is currently unclear which agency is responsible
for overseeing and approving China’s military exports, and
it is also ambiguous how the approval process has changed.
Other important questions remain unanswered such as
which government agencies are still involved in the
approval process and which are not; what kinds of influence
these players have in the new process; and what type of
high-level involvement in the process still exists? Under one
scenario, the new COSTIND has assumed responsibility for
vetting China’s arms exports. But this outcome also raises
the prospect that the financial interests of China’s military
industries, which COSTIND oversees, may be a greater
factor in arms export decisionmaking. However, as Beijing
seeks to address the range of uncertainties the
reorganization has created, the risks that illicit weapons
exports could sneak through the cracks of China’s evolving
export control system have increased. These evolving
complexities argue for continued close and concerned
observation of Chinese arms exports by U.S. diplomats,
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policymakers, military planners, and civilian and military
intelligence organizations.
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Figure 1. U.S. Congressional Research Service
Data for China’s Arms Deliveries, 1990-1998.

Figure 2. SIPRI Data for China’s Arms
Deliveries, 1990-1998.
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Figure 3. U.S. Congressional Research Service
Data for Total World Arms Deliveries to
Developing Nations, 1990-1998.

Figure 4. SIPRI Data for Total World Arms
Deliveries to Developing Nations, 1990-1998.
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Figure 5. CRS and SIPRI Data on China’s
Percentage of World Arms Transfers (based upon
current U.S. dollars).
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APPENDIX I
ACRONYMS

ACME

Arms Control in the Middle East

AED

Aeronautical Engineering Department

APC

armored personnel carrier

APL

anti-personnel landmines

ASM

anti-ship missile

AVIC

Aviation Industries of China

CAD

computer aided design

CAEA

China Atomic Energy Agency

CAM

computer aided manufacture

CASC

China Aerospace Corporation

CATIC

China National Aero-Technology
Import- ExportCorporation

CCL

Commerce Department Control List

CDSTIC

China Defense Science and
Technology Information Center

CGWIC

China Great Wall Industry Corporation

CMC

Central Military Commission

CNNC

China National Nuclear Corporation

COCOM

Coordinating Committee on
Multilateral Export Controls

COSTIND

State Commission on Science,
Technology and Industry for
National Defense
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CPMIEC

China Precision Machinery
Import-Export Corporation

CRS

Congressional Research Service

CSSC

China State Shipbuilding Corporation

CSTC

China Shipbuilding Trading
Corporation

CTBT

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty

FMCT

Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty

FTL

Foreign Trade Law

GAC

General Administration of Customs

GAD

General Armaments Department

GLD

General Logistics Department

GSD

General Staff Department

MFA

Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ML

Munitions List

MOFTEC

Ministry of Foreign Trade
and Economic Cooperation

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding

MTCR

Missile Technology Control Regime

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NORINCO

China North Industries Corporation

NPT

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty

PAP

Peoples Armed Police

PLA

Peoples Liberation Army

LAAF

Peoples Liberation Army Air Force

SACMPT

State Administration Committee
on Military Products Trade
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SAM

surface-to-air missile

SBMPT

State Bureau of Military Products
Trade

SETC

State Economic and Trade Commission

SLV

space launch vehicle

SSM

surface-to-surface missile

TMD

theater missile defense

UNROCA

United Nations Register
of Conventional Arms

83

APPENDIX II
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
REGULATIONS ON EXPORT CONTROL OF
MILITARY ITEMS
OCTOBER 22, 1997
Translated from Chinese by
The East Asia Nonproliferation Project,
Center for Nonproliferation Studies

I. General Rules
ARTICLE 1
The Regulations are formulated to strengthen
centralized management of military exports and maintain
normal military export order.
ARTICLE 2
The military exports referred to in the Regulations are
commercial exports of military-purpose equipment,
specialized production facilities and other materials,
technologies and related services.
ARTICLE 3
Under the leadership of the State Council and the
Central Military Commission, the State Administrative
Committee on Military Products Trade (SACMPT) of the
People’s Republic of China is responsible for military export
activities nationwide.
The State Bureau of Military Products Trade of the
People’s Republic of China, the executive body of the
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SACMPT, implements the supervision and management of
nationwide military exports.
ARTICLE 4
The State enforces a centralized military export
management mechanism to prohibit any military export
activities that damage the national interests and security
and to maintain normal military export order in accordance
with the law.
ARTICLE 5
All military exports should be consistent with the
following principles:
(1) They should assist the recipient country to develop its
legitimate self-defense capabilities;
(2) They should not jeopardize the peace, security and
stability in the relevant regions and around the world;
(3) They should not interfere in the internal affairs of the
recipient country.
ARTICLE 6
Provisions of international treaties which the People’s
Republic of China has concluded or joined shall prevail in
case they are different from the Regulations. However,
clauses about which the People’s Republic of China has
made statements of reservation are excluded.
II. Military Trading Companies
ARTICLE 7
Military trading companies referred to in the
Regulations are corporate legal entities that have legally
obtained military export authorization to engage in military
export activities within the approved business scope.
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ARTICLE 8
Military export authorization is reviewed and granted
by the SACMPT. Specific application procedures will be
stipulated by the SACMPT.
ARTICLE 9
Military trading companies will operate independently
in accordance with the law and be responsible for their own
profits and losses.
ARTICLE 10
Military trading companies shall abide by contracts,
guarantee product quality and improve after-sales services.
ARTICLE 11
Military trading companies, as required by the SACMPT
regulations, shall faithfully submit documents and files
related to their military export activities to the relevant
departments. These departments shall maintain
commercial confidentiality and safeguard the legitimate
rights and interests of the military trading companies.
ARTICLE 12
Military trading companies can entrust authorized
military export transportation agents to handle export
transportation and other related businesses. The SACMPT
will draw up the specifics in this aspect.
III. Military Export Management
ARTICLE 13
The State manages military exports through a licensing
system.
Military exports and contracts shall be filed for review
and approval in accordance with the Regulations. Military
exports must be accompanied by military export licenses.
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ARTICLE 14
Military exports are reviewed and approved by the State
Bureau of Military Products Trade or by the State Bureau of
Military Products Trade in joint consultation with the
relevant departments in the State Council and the Central
Military Commission.
ARTICLE 15
Once the military export is approved, the military
trading company can sign military export contracts with
overseas buyers. The signed military export contract shall
be submitted to the State Bureau of Military Products
Trade for review and approval. The State Bureau of Military
Products Trade shall make an approval or decline decision
within fifteen days upon receipt of the application. Military
export contracts are valid only upon such approval.
Military trading companies shall append with the
military export contract approval application the valid
certification documents from recipient countries when filing
with the State Bureau of Military Products Trade.
ARTICLE 16
Major military exports and their related contracts shall
be reviewed by the SACMPT and submitted to the State
Council and the Central Military Commission for approval.
ARTICLE 17
Military trading companies shall apply to obtain the
military export license with the approval documents for the
export contracts prior to engaging in military exports. The
State Bureau of Military Products Trade shall issue
military export licenses within five days upon receipt of the
application to those requests that conform to the military
export contract specifications.
The Customs will accept declarations upon presentation
of the license to examine and allow passage of the items in
accordance with the relevant State regulations.
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ARTICLE 18
The SACMPT will formulate the procedures for
reviewing and approving military exports and contracts and
for issuing military export licenses.
ARTICLE 19
Military export notification will be issued jointly by the
State Bureau of Military Products Trade with other
relevant departments. Upon receipt of such notification, the
departments and local people’s governments concerned
shall seriously fulfill their duties in accordance with the
relevant State provisions to ensure the safety, promptness
and accuracy of military exports.
IV. Military Export Order
ARTICLE 20
No units or organizations shall engage in military export
activities without obtaining authorization in advance.
The State prohibits individuals in military export
operations.
ARTICLE 21
Military trading companies shall abide by the law and
provisions of administrative regulations in their military
export activities to ensure the normal order of military
exports.
ARTICLE 22
Military trading companies shall not exhibit any of the
following behaviors in their military export activities:
(1) Endanger national security or social and public
interests;
(2) Supplant competitors with unfair competitive means;
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(3) Infringe upon intellectual rights protected by the
laws of the People’s Republic of China;
(4) Forge, alter, fraudulently obtain or transfer military
export approval documents, contract approval documents,
licenses, valid certificates from recipient countries, and
other documents;
(5) Exceed the defined and approved scope of activities;
(6) Other activities that violate the laws and
administrative regulations.
ARTICLE 23
The State Bureau of Military Products Trade, on its own
initiative or upon requests from other military trading
companies, can take actions against conducts that interfere
with the normal military export order.
V. Legal Responsibilities
ARTICLE 24
The State Bureau of Military Products Trade will give
warning to and demand within a definite time corrective
measures from the military trading companies that violate
Article 11 of the Regulations. If no correction is made within
the prescribed period of time, the State Bureau of Military
Products Trade will request the SACMPT to revoke the
military export authorizations granted to such military
trading companies.
ARTICLE 25
The military trading companies that violate Article 21
and Article 22 of the Regulations will be penalized by the
relevant State authorities according to the laws and
administrative regulations. The State Bureau of Military
Products Trade can request the SACMPT to revoke the
military export authorizations granted to such military
trading companies.
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ARTICLE 26
Units that violate Article 20 of the Regulations will have
their illegal activities closed down by the State Bureau of
Military Products Trade and will be penalized by the State
authorities concerned according to the relevant laws and
administrative regulations.
ARTICLE 27
Any violations to the Regulations that constitute
criminal offenses will be prosecuted according to law.
ARTICLE 28
Military trading companies that plead not guilty to the
penalization that revokes their export authorizations can
apply for review to the SACMPT within fifteen days of
receipt of the penalization notification. The SACMPT shall
make a review decision within fifteen days of receipt of the
application. The review decision shall be deemed final.
ARTICLE 29
Staff working in national military export administration
and management posts who neglect duties, perform
fraudulent practices for selfish ends, abuse power, or accept
and demand bribes shall be prosecuted according to law if
criminal offenses have been committed. Disciplinary
penalties will be given to those whose conducts do not
constitute criminal offenses.
VI. Appendix
ARTICLE 30
The export of police-purpose equipment is governed by
the Regulations.
ARTICLE 31
The Regulations become effective on January 1, 1998.
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APPENDIX VI
INTERNET SITES FOR CHINESE
ORGANIZATIONS INVOLVED IN MILITARY
EXPORTS AND EXPORT CONTROLS

China Great Wall Industry Corporation
www.cyberexp.com/company/gw/gw.htm
China Precision Machinery Import-Export Fuzhou
Corporation
www.nease.net/~lngzol/tungoil.html
China Precision Machinery Import-Export
Shenzhen Corporation
www.cpmiesc.com
China National Aero-Technology
Import-Export Corporation (CATIC)
www.catic.com
Aviation Industries of China
www.avic.com.cn
China Shipbuilding Trading Company Ltd.
www.shipbuilding.com.cn
cstckm.com
www.chinaships.com
China Xinxing Export-Import Corporation
www.cxxc.com/xinxing-homepage
China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO)
www.norinco.com
www.norincogroup.com.cn
General Defense Industry-related Websites
www.nuclear.cetin.net.cn
www.aero.cetin.net.cn
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www.electron.cetin.net.cn
www.ship.cetin.net.cn
www.north.cetin.net.cn
State Commission on Science Technology and
Industry for National Defense (COSTIND)
www.costind.gov.cn
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
www.fmprc.gov.cn
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic
Cooperation
www.moftec.com
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC)
www.setc.cn.net
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